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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law has been part of international law since the 
end of the nineteenth century, when the Berne Convention, one 
of the first precursors of globalization, came into force in 1886.  
But copyright law has specifically undergone a dramatic change in 
the past decade; it no longer strives toward the “encouragement of 
learning,” in the words of the English Statute of Anne (1709), or 
toward “promoting the progress of science,” in the words of the 
United States Constitution.  Now, more than ever before, 
copyright serves the purpose of trade. 
A decade ago, the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations 
created the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, within the 
framework of the WTO, the Trade Related Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was devised.1  Copyright 
scholar David Nimmer wrote thereafter that, “[c]opyright has now 
entered the world of international trade,” and declared the “end 
of copyright law.”2 
Copyright, of course, did not disappear with the advent of the 
WTO and TRIPS, but it did change dramatically.  The new 
copyright regime is no longer a law of the public and for the 
public, but rather, a law of business, for businessmen and 
investors.  We now have a global copyright (G©) regime.  This is a 
shift in the essence of copyright law, which goes hand in hand with 
the ongoing commodification of information and the dramatic 
expansion of copyright law that has taken place in developed 
countries over the past decade.3  These two processes, the 
commodification of information and the expansion of copyright, 
work to reinforce each other. 
Old copyright law was a delicate and complex balance of the 
interests and rights of authors (past, current and future), and the 
interests and rights of users and the public in general.  The 
globalization of copyright law and its shift from “the field of 
cultural production”4 to that of trade has reshuffled the cards 
(including the trumps, i.e., the legal rights)5 and destabilized 
 
 1 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 2 See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright Law, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (1995) 
(discussing the impact of the TRIPS agreement on U.S. copyright law).  See also id. at 1412 
(explaining that “copyright now serves as an adjunct of trade.”). 
 3 See EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 
2002). 
 4 PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION (1993). 
 5 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron 
ed., 1984).  The term “trump” is taken from Dworkin.  Id. 
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previous balances.  In light of concerns that the old foundations of 
copyright law will collapse under the heavy weight of global forces, 
this shift to a trade-focused understanding of copyright law 
requires a reevaluation of at least some of those foundations.  This 
article addresses the concern that due to the globalization of 
copyright, local culture, access to information, access to 
knowledge, freedom of research, and free speech in general will 
not be accorded appropriate importance in the face of expanding 
copyright. 
This article attempts to trace the impact globalization has had 
on copyright law as it has shifted toward becoming a matter of 
trade.  This article examines the intersection of copyright law and 
free speech.  The intersection of copyright law and free speech is 
important in itself, but it also provides a jumping-off point for an 
exploration of copyright in general.6 
The thesis of this article is composed of two sub-arguments 
and a third that ties the two sub-arguments together.  The first 
argument is a normative evaluation of G© law.  Several scholars 
documented and critically evaluated the process by which copyright 
became global over the past decade.7  They described in great 
 
 6 Much of the critical discourse on copyright and free speech in recent years, in 
academia and elsewhere, has retained its focus and remained within the contours of 
copyright law – only occasionally turning to other legal branches, such as antitrust law.  
The critical view on the commodification of information, or the “public domain” project, 
for example, remains a useful lens through which the concerns that arise in the face of 
the expansion of copyright law can be conceptualized.  See, e.g., Conference, 
Commodification of Information, HAIFA LAW FACULTY,  
http://law.haifa.ac.il/events/event_sites/info-comm/abstact.htm (1999); Conference, 
Conference on the Public Domain, DUKE LAW SCHOOL,  
http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (2001).  Both conferences resulted in 
extensive scholarship.  Recently, there has been a fresh attempt to reframe the concerns 
in a positive agenda, of “access to knowledge”, see Conference, Access to Knowledge, YALE 
LAW SCHOOL, http://research.yale.edu/isp/eventsa2k.html (2006).  These are intriguing 
and powerful ideas which have the potential to provide overarching themes and an 
alternative to the property-driven narrative which plagues much of the current discourse 
on copyright law.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004) (describing the 
“property narrative”). 
  On a global level, the reframed idea is the “development agenda.”  A2K and the 
development agenda have the power to be proactive, in that they not only criticize the 
disadvantages of the contemporary (global) copyright regime, but also outline a positive 
agenda.  See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2823 (2006) (suggesting that a global intellectual property regime 
should include a principle of substantive equality). 
  At this point, the ideas of A2K and the Development Agenda still require 
crystallization and refinement.  Hence, focusing on free speech jurisprudence as the 
counter-measure of the expansion of copyright law has the benefits of addressing a 
familiar idea, especially within the North’s liberal democracies. 
 7 See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and 
Dialogue, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 161 (Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne, eds., 2002) [hereinafter Negotiating]; 
NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER – GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE DEATH OF 
DEMOCRACY (2001); Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) 
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585 (2001); MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE 
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detail how a few mega-corporations captured international 
organizations and managed to channel their business models 
through international treaties, provisions of which would later be 
incorporated into national legal systems.8  This article focuses not 
on the process of G© but on evaluating the outcome thereof, i.e., 
the nature of G©.  This examination of G© reveals that currently 
copyright reflects an ideology of trade, and that copyright law has 
been detached from its previously underlying philosophies.  
“Ideology of trade” refers to a capitalistic view that elevates the 
free market and its efficient functioning to the top priority, 
making it the single most important social norm that trumps all 
other interests and recruits them to serve its end. 
The second argument applies the framework of G© to a 
specific but fundamental area of copyright law: the conflict that 
exists (or does not, depending upon whom you ask) between 
copyright law and free speech.  The argument notes a peculiar 
discrepancy: while copyright has become global, free speech 
jurisprudence has remained local, and hence, different from place 
to place.9  The result is that the answers given to the alleged 
copyright-speech conflict in one place (that copyright is the 
engine of free speech, for example) do not necessarily fit in other 
places.10  Accordingly, Part II of this article offers a glance into the 
political and social phenomena of globalization in general, and 
then focuses on intellectual property law and copyright law in 
particular.  Part II also introduces the concept of GloCalization, 
i.e., the fusion of the global and the local. 
Part III is devoted to surveying the status of speech – and the 
status of freedom of speech – around the globe.  Despite attempts 
to create an international principle of free speech, there is no 
 
DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 91 
(1998). 
 8 See HERTZ, supra note 7. 
 9 Free speech is not only a matter of law.  Rather, it is a matter of political and 
cultural tradition.  A country’s free speech principle is usually the result of an ongoing 
dialectical process where the local culture and the law influence and shape each other.  
This issue is further elaborated in Part III, infra. 
 10 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss observed this asymmetry on a wider scale, stating that 
core protections for users are, on the whole, not found in intellectual property 
laws themselves, but rather in other law or, more obscurely, embedded in the 
structure of the legal regime as a whole.  Indeed, for developing countries, this 
is an important part of the problem.  Because these states lack the background 
rules that developed countries take for granted, the bases for limiting the scope 
of rights, or for implying user protections into law, are largely absent.   
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 
30 (2004) [hereinafter TRIPS-Round II].   
  I focus on one such “external” law, namely free speech law.  See also Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public 
Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431, 448 (2004) (making a similar argument in the 
context of patent law and TRIPS). 
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such unified principle.  Free speech remains a local matter, with 
free speech jurisprudence and the “tradition” of free speech 
varying from one jurisdiction to another.  Furthermore, free 
speech jurisprudence is contingent upon a country’s history, 
culture, legal system, and current national agenda.  A comparison 
of the level of free speech and the economic status of WTO 
members reveals that there is a direct correlation between the 
level of economic development (free trade) and that of free 
speech.  Part III further concludes that freedom of speech is 
unlikely to be subject to a global regime in the near future. 
Part IV addresses the alleged conflict between copyright law 
and free speech and the various responses offered by courts in 
developed countries that attempt to explain why the conflict is 
unproblematic.  The judicial responses usually state either that 
there is no such conflict, or that the conflict has been satisfactorily 
addressed.  Equipped with the conclusions from the previous Parts 
about the nature of G© and the local nature of free speech, this 
Part will take the copyright law/free speech conflict to the global 
level.  It concludes that in a world of G© and local speech, the 
conflict between property limitations on the use of creative works 
on the one hand and the freedom to use these works to enhance 
creativity, culture, and democratic participation on the other 
hand, is better understood as a case of GloCalization.  The 
copyright/speech conflict is both legal and political, and it 
enables the global norms of trade to collide with local culture.  
When copyright law is imposed upon countries without a strong 
tradition of free speech, access to information is limited, as is the 
use of such information, and the as the formation of new speech.  
In other words, the trade benefits to the North come at the 
expense of freedom in the South.11  The lessons derived from the 
comparison of free trade and free speech emphasize the 
inappropriateness of the North’s treatment of the South. 
It is important to realize that one size (copyright) does not fit 
all (countries).  Despite the undisputed need for harmonization of 
copyright law on a global scale, the expansion of copyright law 
should be softened, and copyright should be redirected to its 
original productive and benevolent goal: the promotion of 
 
 11 The terms North and South have come to refer to the industrialized, developed 
countries, and low-income, developing and less developed countries, respectively.  The 
vertical description based on an economic criterion has replaced the horizontal West-East 
division, based on political and ideological criteria, which dominated political discourse 
during the Cold War.  See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, North-South Relations in the Present 
Context: A New Dependency?, in THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: 
REFLECTIONS ON OUR CHANGING WORLD 149, 156 (Martin Carnoy, Stephen S. Cohen & 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso eds., 1993) (describing the shift from the East-West polarity 
to the North-South polarity). 
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culture.  Global institutions, such as the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) and the WTO, should also 
recognize the impact that G© has had on opportunities for 
speech, and act accordingly.  The Development Agenda currently on 
WIPO’s table is a good step in this direction.12 
II. THE NEW WORLD IP ORDER 
A. Globalization 
Globalization has become a buzzword in recent years, 
especially since the Battle of Seattle in 1999,13 though this 
economic, political, and cultural phenomenon started long 
before.  A lot of water has passed under the bridge since Marshall 
McLuhan wrote about the global village in 1964.14  Much was 
written about the pros and cons of globalization in various 
disciplines.  The criticisms of globalization stem from social and 
economic concerns and political views, and is driven by fear of 
environmental effects, violations of human rights, and other 
concerns.  Support for globalization is based on liberal ideologies, 
some theories of macro-economics, and a belief that capitalism 
and globalization can lead to freedom and liberty.  This Part 
begins by presenting several definitions of globalization.  It then 
provides an overview of the arguments for and against 
globalization and attempts to identify the role of the law in the 
process. 
 
 12 See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Proposal by Argentina and 
Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO (Aug. 27, 2004), 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.
pdf.  The proposal’s goal is to “ensure, in all countries, that the costs do not outweigh the 
benefits of IP protection.”  Id. at 2.  The proposal then lists several specific issues where 
the concerns of developing and less developed countries should be taken into 
consideration, such as access to information and knowledge, technology transfer, and IP 
enforcement.  Of particular relevance to this article is the statement that “[t]he provisions 
of any treaties in this field must be balanced and clearly take on board the interests of 
consumers and the public at large.  It is important to safeguard the exceptions and 
limitations existing in the domestic laws of Member States.”  Id. at 2, § IV. 
 13 This term refers to the demonstrations that took place in Seattle in late November 
and early December, 1999, during the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial 
Conference.  The demonstrators represented myriad interests and ideologies, though 
they shared the general view of what is now known as anti-globalization.  There are 
numerous documentations of the events, and many cultural and political interpretations 
thereof.  One of the more interesting interpretations is that of Naomi Klein, whose writing 
seems to have inspired many of the demonstrators and provided them with eloquent, 
although controversial, arguments.  See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2001); NAOMI KLEIN, 
FENCES AND WINDOWS – DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINE OF THE GLOBALIZATION 
DEBATE (2002). 
 14 MARSHAL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 34 (1964). 
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1. Defining Globalization 
Globalization has acquired many definitions over a short 
period, and there is no single agreed-upon definition.15  There are 
several perspectives through which globalization can be addressed, 
and the corresponding definitions vary accordingly.  The 
discussion that follows distinguishes the definitions for the sake of 
clarity,16 although all the definitions are interrelated. 
One view of globalization is descriptive.  This descriptive view 
refers to the connectedness of people around the world.  The 
means of communication and transportation available to 
humanity are continually improving.  It is now easier, faster, 
cheaper, and safer (at least from a technological perspective) to 
travel from one place to another, and more people travel now 
than ever before.  People also communicate more easily, using 
technologies such as electronic mail, satellite telephony, cellular 
phones and Internet telephony (VoIP).  While the end of the Cold 
War and other political and economic changes have accompanied 
technological progress, the descriptive view of globalization 
focuses on human interaction.  In this McLuhanian sense, the 
world has become, at least relatively speaking, a global village. 
A second meaning of globalization is cultural 
homogenization.  More people now share similar cultural 
backgrounds, or at least similar cultural experiences, with respect 
to fashion, food, art, and even music and movies.  Harry Potter, 
Madonna, Disney, Hollywood movies, Nike, MTV, Microsoft 
products, Peer to Peer (P2P) file sharing technologies, and 
McDonalds are all examples of this shared culture.  Young people 
today have much more in common with their peers around the 
world than their parents’ generation did.  The “global village” 
means that the world is becoming closer, more uniform, and 
culturally standardized.  Cultural homogenization means that 
local, distinctive values and traditions change, and some may even 
disappear.  Of course, there are still many cultural differences 
between peer groups around the world.  Language, tradition, 
religion, financial divides and other factors prevent many from 
being part of the emerging global culture, and even those who are 
caught up in the global culture experience it differently.  Much of 
this global culture is ideological: the emerging global culture 
carries and conveys (and reinforces) a message of consumerism, 
 
 15 For a sociological account of globalization, see ROLAND ROBERTSON, 
GLOBALIZATION – SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE (1992). 
 16 See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization as Hybridization, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 45 
(Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash & Roland Robertson eds., 1997) (discussing the 
indeterminacy of the many conceptualizations of globalization). 
  
498 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 24:491 
dividing the world into producers and consumers; sellers and 
buyers.17  Money is the key to participation in the consumerist 
culture, and capital is the vision.  In such a global village, 
producers of cultural products target a global audience of 
potential buyers, often turning to the least common denominator, 
which easily crosses borders. 
A third meaning of globalization is economic.  Under this 
view, globalization envisions worldwide growth within one united 
market rather than in separate geographic and political 
economies.  The means to achieve economic globalization is 
through free trade, especially the free flow of capital and direct 
foreign investments, accompanied by technological diffusion.  
Economic growth is the ultimate goal, and efficiency, competition, 
and specialization are cast as the chief tools of integrating 
economies.  In this context, “free trade” means uninhibited flow 
of capital, goods and labor, and, in the context of G©, it means 
the free flow of commodified information.  This creates an 
interesting juxtaposition, where commodified information is 
superimposed upon “free” information – free from regulation and 
private control.18  This form of economic globalization requires 
the removal of so-called trade barriers, such as tariffs, import 
quotas, and various labor-related regulations.19  Economic 
globalization requires foreign investments not to be burdened.  It 
also means that the flow of human capital is easier, such that 
employees can migrate from one place to another.  Economic 
globalization is thus an enhanced version of capitalism: the idea of 
a free market is transposed onto the global market.  Whereas free 
market ideology insists on a laissez-faire approach and limits 
governmental intervention with the market, the ideology of the 
global economy limits governmental intervention in general, in an 
attempt to bypass local governments.20 
Who gains from globalization?  Why is it such a contested 
process?  The debate regarding globalization is political, and, in 
 
 17 For a discussion of globalization along the lines of the cultural ideology of 
consumerism, see LESLIE SKLAIR, SOCIOLOGY OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (1995). 
 18 Thanks to Peter Drahos for suggesting this juxtaposition. 
 19 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines globalization as “the increasingly 
close integration of markets for commodities, labor, and capital.”  IMF, Seminar, 
Globalization in Historical Perspective (Aug. 12, 2002), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/global/eng/index.htm.  See IMF, 
Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? (Apr. 12, 2000) (corrected Jan. 2002), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II. 
 20 Both the free market and the free trade ideologies resent external intervention in 
the markets and prefer deregulation to regulation.  However, once a market failure is 
identified, regulation is justified.  The production of creative works and research and 
development might not take place when the products can be copied; hence, under the 
economic analysis of intellectual property, regulation of creative production in the form 
of copyright law is not only justified, but required to enable the functioning of the market. 
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order to better understand its intellectual property context, a brief 
survey of this debate is due. 
2. The Debate About Globalization 
The “global village” view of globalization resonates well with 
those who enjoy the new opportunities created by the progress of 
communication and transportation.  In addition to the glamour of 
being cosmopolitan citizens of the global village, these citizens 
appreciate the closer relationships facilitated by the sharing of a 
common cultural identity and the establishment of new 
communities, virtual or real, which operate across political and 
geographical borders.  However, the most active proponents of 
globalization are those who benefit from its economic impact, 
namely, investors and transnational mega-corporations. 
There are economic, ideological, and political arguments in 
favor of globalization.  The few countries that have managed to 
progress (economically, as measured by their Gross National 
Product (GNP)) serve as proof of the economic success of 
globalization.  Proponents, such as scholar Jagdish Bhagwati, point 
to statistics and argue that “trade enhances growth, and that 
growth reduces poverty.”21  It is often the case that globalization is 
associated with democratization and with freedom:22 “globalization 
leads to prosperity, and prosperity in turn leads to 
democratization of politics with the rise of the middle class.”23  
According to Bhagwati, the democracy-enabling factor is the new 
technology, which enables the poor (“rural farmers” in Bhagwati’s 
words) to bypass those in power (“dominant classes and castes”).24  
Bhagwati’s argument thus builds on the disintermediation effect 
of technology.25  However, Bhagwati’s discussion indicates that the 
causation between globalization and democratization has yet to be 
established.26  This argument is fostered by the change in the 
political climate in the aftermath of the Cold War and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  In the aftermath of the turbulent Cold War era, 
in the mid-1990s, Francis Fukuyama declared that it was the “end 
of history,” in the sense that the battle over ideologies had been 
 
 21 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 53 (2004). 
 22 See, e.g., Peter Martin, The Moral Case for Globalisation, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE 
(May 1997), available at http://mondediplo.com/1997/05/globalisation3157. 
 23 BHAGWATI, supra note 21, at 94. 
 24 Id. at 93. 
 25 For the disintermediation effect of technology, see ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE 
CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND 
CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999); NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, 
ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE 91 (2004). 
 26 BHAGWATI, supra note 21, at 93-96. 
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decided, in favor of liberal, capitalistic democracies.27  
Unfortunately, Fukayama’s statement was premature, and there is 
still a deep cultural divide in our world,28 and several civilizations 
remain in conflict.29 
The arguments in favor of globalization are not left 
unchallenged.  The movement against globalization brought 
together many critics with different agendas.  Concerns about 
poverty, health, wealth distribution, decline of education and, 
more generally, about social injustice and inequality, together with 
concerns of cultural imperialism, environmental devastation and 
economic effects, such as unemployment, all became common 
ground for the emerging coalition against globalization.30  From 
the streets of Seattle, Prague, Genoa, Washington and other sites 
where the WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and The Group of Eight (G8) leaders met while 
demonstrators clashed with the police, one common theme 
emerged: the complaint against globalization is about the abuse of 
power.  No one seriously doubts the fact that the world is more 
“global” than ever before.  Political changes, such as the end of 
the Cold War, the strengthening of the European Union, and the 
emergence of new democracies, combined with technological 
changes, such as satellite television and, of course, the Internet, all 
enable globalization.  This is the very embodiment of the 
McLuhanian global village.  Leaving aside the arguments in favor 
of a return to nature, à la Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the argument 
against globalization does not seriously challenge these post-Cold 
War changes, nor does it resist them.  Rather, the argument 
against globalization is that the stronger kids on the block use 
their power to take advantage of the weaker kids; that inequality of 
wealth is abused to further strengthen the stronger members of 
the global economy at the expense of the poor.  Essentially, the 
complaint is that the benefits of globalization are unfairly shared 
by a few rich corporations rather than by the majority of human 
beings in each nation within the global village.  This might be a 
problem of adjustment; that globalization at too rapid a pace 
causes friction.  New tools, new mindsets and new policies require 
 
 27 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993). 
 28 See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE 
SHAPING THE WORLD (1995). 
 29 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF 
WORLD ORDER (1998). 
 30 See generally THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE 
LOCAL 297 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE CASE 
AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY]. 
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time to settle in and to be gradually implemented.  Globalization 
cannot be achieved overnight. 
There are many underlying themes and interests at play in 
the globalization analysis, and several interests are in conflict with 
each other.  Some critics of globalization object to it on the basis 
of the consumerism of the North.  Others protest the power held 
by global corporations.31  Still others object to globalizations based 
on either socialist or nationalist sentiments.  Occasionally, 
objections to globalization are addressed to a specific corporation 
or a particular country.  Some opponents of globalization, 
addressing its democratic deficiencies32 fear that the rush of 
capitalism imposed on new, previously non-capitalist democracies 
will negatively affect their fragile economies and social fabrics. 
Another critique of globalization challenges the image of 
globalization.  Globalization is marketed as an opportunity to 
achieve technological progress and economic prosperity.  Critics 
argue, however, that this is a hollow image and that globalization 
lacks a “human face.”  Consider the common terminology used in 
international forums to distinguish between developed countries, 
developing countries, and least developed countries (LDCs).  As 
long as the Cold War occupied the West and the East, LDCs were 
regarded as “third world countries.”  Now, the criterion for 
distinguishing between nations is no longer political.  Instead, it is 
the economy that matters.  The United Nations publishes the 
authoritative list of LDCs, which is based on low income, human 
resource weaknesses, and economic vulnerability.33  Currently, 
there are fifty countries on this list.34  The terminology carries a 
(false) message: that the developing and least developed countries 
are at a temporary stage; that a least developed country can 
become a developing country and ultimately join the developed 
countries.  Some countries have managed to upgrade themselves – 
South Korea is one example35 – but the top end of the scale is not 
 
 31 Tony Clarke, Mechanisms of Corporate Rule, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY, supra note 30, at 297. 
 32 See Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach, GATT, NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Democratic 
Process, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 30, at 92. 
 33 See U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, The Criteria for 
the Identification of the LDCs, http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006); Wolfgang Sachs, Neo-
Development: “Global Ecological Management,” in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 
supra note 30, at 239-41 (criticizing the economic nature of these criteria). 
 34 See U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, List of LDCs, 
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).  The U.N. 
does not compose a list of developed or developing countries. 
 35 However, there is a debate as to the factors that brought about the economic 
development of South Korea.  See, e.g., Wooseok Ok, Policy Complementarities in Economic 
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fixed.  The developed countries keep progressing at a pace that is 
far faster than that of the least developed countries. 
This critique attempts to expose the real face of 
globalization.36  Scholars and critics gather information about the 
costs of globalization, which are not spread equally.  These 
scholars document the North’s politics towards the South and 
attempt to expose the hidden mechanisms by which the North 
gains, while others lose.  Sometimes revealing the methods behind 
the North’s gains it is an easy task, but in other cases, those hidden 
mechanisms require more delicate unearthing.37  Accordingly, this 
article attempts to trace some aspects of globalization in the field 
of copyright law and assess its ramifications, which are not found 
in broad strokes, but in minute details. 
While the debate continues, the campaign against 
globalization is an uphill one.  Globalization is carried out in many 
ways, and the process is a constant one.  International bodies such 
as the IMF or the World Bank and other global institutions, such 
as the WTO, are all forums of globalization.  Global media 
networks, such as MTV and CNN, are yet another forum of 
globalization.  There are other cultural and political mechanisms 
of globalization, however, in this article, the focus is on the role of 
the law in globalization, or globalization-by-law. 
3. Globalization-by-Law 
The law is an important tool by which power is exercised.  
The law imposes the command of the sovereign with more subtlety 
than does sheer force.  But the law is no less powerful than brute 
force.  The law is a civilized, amorphous, and intangible 
mechanism, and it is within this gentle façade that the power of 
the rule of law lies.  The law is inaccessible and incomprehensible 
to most citizens.  An employee who is fired because her workplace 
has been relocated to another country overnight cannot be 
expected to intuitively identify “the law” as the cause of her misery, 
let alone the laws of globalization.38 
 
Development: The Case of South Korea, 5 J. KOREAN ECON. 7 (2004). 
 36 One of the most prominent critics in economics is Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz.  
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
 37 See, e.g., Edward Goldsmith, Development as Colonialism, in THE CASE AGAINST THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 30, at 253, 261 (describing how the North controls the 
South by way of lending money for aid).  See also Walden Bello, Structural Adjustment 
Programs: “Success” for Whom?, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 30, 
at 285 (discussing “Structural Adjustment Programs” imposed on countries of the South).  
See generally South Centre: An Intergovernmental Organization of Developing Countries, 
http://www.southcentre.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
 38 There are a few exceptions.  A demonstration by half a million Indian farmers in 
1993 in Bangalore against the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT), the 
precursor to the WTO, was an outstanding preview of the demonstrations that would 
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The laws of globalization employ sophisticated means to 
execute the global agenda.  The laws that enable globalization 
usually have a local incarnation.  The political structure is simple 
but crude: a country joins an international legal instrument and is 
required to adapt its laws so as to meet its new international 
commitments.  Thus, the last chain of globalization is always a 
local law, which is enforced through local mechanisms.  Citizens 
are likely to place the blame first on their own governments (at 
least in democracies), and not on international bodies, other 
countries, or some obscure international treaty.  It is only at a later 
stage, when greater understanding of the political process is 
gained, that the blame of ordinary citizens is directed elsewhere. 
Proponents of the idea of globalization-by-law call on another 
idea for support: harmonization.  The diversity of laws among 
nations is blamed as an impediment to trade and progress, and 
harmonization is called on as the solution.39  Critics of 
harmonization, however, are skeptical, since harmonization means 
giving up the unique attributes of the local polity.  These critics 
argue that harmonization is just a disguise, and that there is no 
harmony in a world where the powerful impose their will upon the 
weak. 
However, globalization is a complex economic, political, 
social, and cultural process and need not necessarily be all-or-
nothing.  An awareness of this concept leads to an examination of 
the intermediate points on the local-global axis: GloCalization. 
B. GloCalization 
Sociologists who document processes of globalization report 
that it has a complex effect on society, involving the interaction of 
global forces, ideologies and economic powers local players.  The 
result of this complex interaction is called GloCalization.40  
 
occur in Seattle in 1999.  See supra note 13.  See Vandana Shiva & Radha Holla-Bhar, Piracy 
by Patent: The Case of the Neem Tree, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 
30 at 146, 148. 
 39 The European Union often describes its measures as those of harmonization, 
although, unlike the more globally applicable mechanisms described in the text, the 
inequality of power among the twenty-five member states is less dramatic than global gaps. 
See e.g., the first recital of the Copyright Directive, stating: “The Treaty provides for the 
establishment of an internal market and the institution of a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted.  Harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States on copyright and related rights contributes to the achievement of these 
objectives.”  Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 274) 33 (EC) (regarding the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society). 
 40 Wikipedia offers two definitions of GloCalization, neither of which reflects the 
argument in the text.  The first is the creation of products intended for the global market, 
but customized to suit local culture.  The second refers to the use of such global 
technologies  as the Internet to offer local services.  Definition of Glocalisation, 
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GloCalization is where global norms meet local norms.  The 
meeting point can be cultural, economic, or political.  One 
sociologist defines GloCalization as “the interpenetration of the 
global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different 
geographic areas.”41  Examples range from the impact that 
globalized fast food restaurants have over local dishes,42 to business 
strategies applied by multinational firms to blend themselves into 
local markets,43 or to the rise of a localized nationalist movement 
in a single country.44  Accordingly, the concept of GloCalization 
can assist in describing social phenomena, explaining them, and 
providing a measure against which one can evaluate globalization.  
Further, it can be a political strategy or a political goal.  In recent 
years, legal analyses have begun to use this concept.45 
GloCalization can also serve as a deliberate strategy 
undertaken to empower local communities.  GloCalization can 
assist in creating a civil society that can cope with, and 
accommodate, the new foreign powers of globalization.46  In this 
sense, GloCalization can ease the shock of globalization.  
Accordingly, GloCalization can be viewed as a social space where 
an unstable, often unpredictable, dialectic relationship takes place 
between the global and the local.  Once the two forces reach some 
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glocalization (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).  See Craig 
Stroupe, Glocalization, IDEAS, http://www.d.umn.edu/~cstroupe/ideas/glocalization.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (in which University of Minnesota professor Craig Stroupe 
defines GloCalization as the existence of direct relationships between communities and 
the global system that bypass national governments and markets). 
 41 See GEORGE RITZER, THE GLOBALIZATION OF NOTHING 73 (2004). 
 42 See Uri Ram, Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local – McDonald’s in 
Israel, 52 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 11 (2004). 
 43 See, e.g., Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in a Postnational Economy: Rethinking 
U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 430 (2002). 
 44 See generally BARBER, supra note 28. 
 45 A WestLaw search (July, 2006) yielded thirty citations of the term “glocalization” in 
United States law review articles (including two with the spelling “glocalisation”).  Most 
articles mentioned it as a term of political science and international relations, and only 
some utilized the concept to argue for actual conclusions.  For uses in the intellectual 
property field, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark 
Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 959 (2004) (applying the concept to 
examine the idea of tying trademark law to the territoriality of good will, regardless of 
political borders). 
  In many cases, the ideas encapsulated in the term “GloCalization” were applied 
without using the term explicitly.  For example, an argument that WTO dispute resolution 
panels should take into account the domestic dynamics of intellectual property law 
making can be explained as a case of GloCalization.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle 
C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Law Making, 36 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 95 (2004).  Understood via the lens of GloCalization, the argument advanced by 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss is a suggestion to infuse local norms into the global adjudication 
process, and thus to enable more space for the local within the global. 
 46 See, e.g., Glocalization, DEVELOPMENT GATEWAY 
http://topics.developmentgateway.org/glocalization (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).  Of 
course, preserving local culture is not always a good idea.  The discussion in the text refers 
to situations in which the attitude toward the local culture is either supportive or neutral, 
and hence finds value in preserving it per se. 
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sort of equilibrium, GloCalization can be said to be the result of 
the global meeting the local.  A successful outcome of 
GloCalization might be one that allows a local community to enjoy 
the best of all worlds: the community can enjoy the benefits of 
globalization without losing the benefits of the local culture, 
economy, and social fabric.  However, the result might also be 
negative: where the disadvantages of each of the two interacting 
forces, the global and local cultures, combine to leave the local 
community with only the detrimental effects of globalization. 
GloCalization offers local culture a chance of surviving in the 
face of the mighty global forces.  It offers an opportunity to 
smooth the process of globalization and to enable the local 
community to participate in shaping its own future.  For a 
traditional community or conservative society striving to preserve 
its social norms and old social order, this is likely to lead to a 
compromise of some sort.  But a compromise is better than an 
unconditional surrender to globalization.  GloCalization thus has 
empowering potential:47 the old community, its political habits, 
and the pre-globalization social norms are not completely 
eliminated, but rather, are adapted to the new situation.  
GloCalization is a compromise between old and new. 
This article now returns to an examination of the ways in 
which intellectual property is global.  Copyright law is becoming a 
global matter, and when G© is applied in a jurisdiction, the result 
is one of GloCalization: there is a meeting of G© and of local 
culture, norms, and traditions.  One meeting point in particular, 
that of G© and freedom of speech, will be examined in Part IV, 
infra. 
C. Intellectual Property Globalization 
A series of treaties – most notably the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works 
(1886), brought intellectual property into the field of 
international law in the late nineteenth century.  These 
conventions established common minimum standards and 
provided benefits to the countries (and their authors and 
inventors) that joined.48  Many countries did not join, however.  
 
 47 GloCal Forum, GloCalization Manifesto (Sept. 7, 2004), 
http://topics.developmentgateway.org/glocalization (under “Key Issues” on the left 
sidebar click on “The Glocalization Manifesto”). 
 48 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].  The national treatment principle, for example, ensures 
  
506 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 24:491 
The United States, for example, joined Berne only in 1989; up 
until then, it had only been a member of the Universal Copyright 
Convention (UCC).49  The Berne Convention is now incorporated 
by reference into the TRIPS Agreement.50  The combined result of 
Berne and TRIPS, as well as other measures, which will be 
discussed shortly, combine to form a G© regime.51  Because of the 
array of international agreements on the subject, copyright laws 
around the globe resemble each other more than most laws in 
other fields. 
Intellectual property globalization has taken three basic and 
interrelated forms over the last two decades: multilateral treaties, 
bilateral agreements, and unilateral measures.  The Uruguay 
Round of Trade Negotiations, which started in the mid-1980s and 
resulted in the mid-1990s with the replacement of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the WTO, reflects 
the shift from an international IP order to a global IP regime.  On 
top of this global infrastructure came bilateral agreements, 
followed by unilateral measures.  Now, all three layers are tied 
together in an expanding spiral form. 
1. Multilateral Treaties 
a. WIPO 
The Berne Convention has been administered by WIPO since 
the 1970s.  However, WIPO’s “one nation, one vote” system gave 
developing countries the power to block the initiatives of 
industrialized nations.52  Those nations and industries that wanted 
a wider scope of protection, greater compliance with the treaty, 
and more tools of local enforcement, had to turn to other 
forums.53  The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations provided 
 
that works are protected in nations other than just that of the origin.  See id. at art. 5. 
 49 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731 [hereinafter UCC], 
revised July 24, 1971, 25.2 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter Paris Amendment].  The leading 
United Kingdom copyright treatise declares that the UCC “has lost part of its raison d’être 
and importance.”  K. GARNETT, J. RAYNER & JAMES G. DAVIES, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES 
ON COPYRIGHT 1174 (14th ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1999).  Currently, ninety-nine countries 
are parties to the UCC, sixty-four of which have ratified the Paris Amendment.  The UCC 
is administered by The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultrual Organization 
(UNESCO).  See generally Universal Copyright Convention, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org (in search window type “copyright convention,” and then click on 
link to “Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971”) (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2006). 
 50 See TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 9(1).  Note that the Berne Convention’s moral rights 
are exempted from the TRIPS Agreement.  Id. 
 51 Okediji suggests that we understand TRIPS as a “regime.”  Okediji’s analysis is based 
on a “regime theory,” derived from international relations theory and international law.  
Okediji, supra note 7, at 597. 
 52 See RYAN, supra note 7, at 104-13; see also Negotiating, supra note 7, at 166. 
 53 See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
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such a forum.54 
b. The Uruguay Negotiations 
The initiative to include intellectual property issues within 
the framework of trade came from a group of industry leaders: the 
Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiation (ACTN), which 
persuaded the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) to do 
so.55  Accordingly, IP was placed on the negotiation table under 
the pressure of a few developed countries.  One of these industry 
leaders, the United States, even went so far as to apply political 
pressure against objecting developing countries in a process 
described by one scholar as no less than “bully[ing].”56 
In the negotiations of TRIPS, developed countries applied a 
strategy of “linkage bargain diplomacy,” in which the developed 
countries tied unrelated issues together and refused to break the 
package: a developing country had the choice of joining and 
accepting all treaties as presented, or declining any part of the 
treaties and being left out.57  It was an all-or-nothing choice.  In the 
case of TRIPS, the linkage was between IP and trade of goods, 
such as agricultural products and textiles.  The negotiations took 
the form of “circles of consensus,” in which a circle of countries in 
agreement was continuously expanded, thereby avoiding a 
confrontational situation.58  This “negotiation” strategy led to the 
inclusion of TRIPS in the framework of the WTO. 
One might object to the notion that developing countries 
 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 20-21 (2004) [hereinafter 
Helfer, Regime Shifting] (arguing that the shift from the WIPO forum to GATT (and WTO, 
including TRIPS) was deliberate, since it provided the United States and the European 
Community with greater power due to the resulting trade leverage, the principle of 
consensus in the WTO, the WTO’s linkage of intellectual property to trade, and the 
dispute resolution system of the WTO). 
  Jessica Litman documented the politics of copyright legislation in the United States.  
She reported the attempts of the pro-copyright parties to promote their interests through 
international bodies, and their (initial) failure to do so in WIPO.  JESSICA LITMAN, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 129 (2001). 
 54 See generally RYAN, supra note 7, at 104-13.  For a documentation of the shift from 
GATT to TRIPS, see DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 10-26 (2d ed. 2003). 
 55 See RYAN, supra note 7, at 105; PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION 
FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 114-120 (2002). (Drahos & 
Braithwaite refer to the Committee as the “ACTN,” the Advisory Committee on Trade 
Negotiation). 
 56 See Ryan, supra note 7, at 108.  Drahos also documents the use by the United States 
of bilateral means to convince objecting countries to accept TRIPS, especially in the case 
of Brazil.  Negotiating, supra note 7, at 170-71. 
 57 RYAN, supra note 7, at 92. 
 58 Drahos describes this as a means to exclude opposition.  Negotiating, supra note 7, at 
167-69.  Gervais, on the contrary, describes the process in a more favorable manner, of 
formal and informal meetings, with full transparency.  GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 20.  For a 
critical analysis of the political strategies that led to TRIPS, see Susan K. Sell, Trips and the 
Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481 (2002). 
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were coerced into consenting during the TRIPS negotiations, as 
no country was forced to join the WTO.59  However, whereas 
joining the Berne Convention was optional for a country, joining 
TRIPS was not: given the linkage of IP and trade, it would have 
been unrealistic to expect a country to opt out of the WTO.  One 
commentator described the pressure to opt into the WTO as being 
made up of a combination of the following: a bargain of European 
Union concessions on agricultural exports, promises by the 
United States not to pursue unilateral measures, and threats that 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations would fail.60  Another 
commentator described it as “old fashioned, Western-style 
imperialism.”61  One view from the South described the 
negotiations as “essentially an asymmetric, non-transparent and 
autocratic process.”62  Even Bhagwati, an enthusiastic pro-
globalization scholar, harshly criticized the inclusion of 
intellectual property within the framework of the WTO, 
concluding that, “the damage inflicted on the WTO system and on 
the poor nations has been substantial,” and that “TRIPS . . . [was] 
like the introduction of cancer cells into a healthy body.”63  
Bhagwati appears to be most disturbed by the effects that global 
patent laws have had on the access of poor people and nations to 
medicine, but he has also critiqued the very inclusion of TRIPS 
within a trade agreement and the politics that led to its inclusion. 
c. TRIPS  
TRIPS now binds the 149 members of the WTO.64  TRIPS 
includes several layers: basic principles, expansion of the bundle 
 
 59 Peter Yu observes that the story of TRIPS is usually told in one of four narratives: a 
bargain narrative, a coercion narrative, an ignorance narrative, and a self-interest 
narrative.  Yu argues that none of these narratives is complete, but each provides valuable 
insights into TRIPS.  Peter K. Yu, The First Ten Years of the TRIPS Agreement: TRIPS and Its 
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, The First Ten 
Years].  The discussion in the current article tells the story of TRIPS with all these 
narratives, and emphasizes the trade aspects in each of these narratives. 
 60 Frederick M. Abbott, The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 21st Century, 
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471, 472-73 (1996). 
 61 Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 615 (1996). 
 62 See South Centre, The TRIPS Agreement – A Guide for the South 8 (1997), 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/trips/tripsagreement.pdf. 
 63 BHAGWATI, supra note 21, at 182-83. 
 64 See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, 
(Dec. 11, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, for a 
current list of WTO members.  TRIPS set three dates for complying: 1996 for the 
developed countries, 2000 for the developing countries, and 2006 for the less developed 
countries.  The latter date was extended to 2016 regarding provisions on pharmaceutical 
patents, as decided in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and 
Public Health. WTO, Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf. 
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of rights, enforcement, and a dispute settlement system. 
The first layer of TRIPS is the requirement of minimum 
standards of protection by the incorporation of the Berne 
Convention, as amended in 1971,65 which ensures some 
commonality among member states.  Under Berne, copyright law 
remained territorial, but each country had to adapt its laws to 
meet the minimum standards of the Convention.  These minimum 
standards were coupled with the “national treatment principle,” 
which required member countries to apply their copyright laws 
equally to citizens of other member countries.66  Berne left the 
members with leeway regarding the application of the minimum 
standards and did not require complete equality in how members 
treated foreign nationals as compared with how members treated 
one another.67  One of TRIPS’ novelties was the introduction of 
the “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) treatment in the context of IP.68  
This principle requires that all nationals of all WTO members 
should enjoy the same legal treatment.69  Thus far, the MFN 
principle is broader than the national treatment principle of 
Berne.  The MFN rule has some exceptions, of which Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) are the most important, since FTAs are the 
avenue through which copyright is expanded beyond that which is 
required by TRIPS.70 
The second layer of TRIPS adds new kinds of works to be 
protected, and expands the bundle of rights beyond those 
guaranteed by the Berne Convention.  For example, TRIPS 
requires protection for computer programs and grants the right of 
commercial rental,71 while the Berne Convention did neither.  
While this change did not represent an expansion of the scope of 
protection afforded to copyright owners in the developed 
countries,72 it greatly expanded the copyright laws of the 
developing countries. 
In the long term, it might be beneficial for developing 
 
 65 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 9. 
 66 Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 5(1). 
 67 For a clear summary of these principles of Berne, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The 
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 736-42 (2001). 
 68 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 4.  See also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 18.06[A][1][b] (1963). 
 69 See GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 104-10. 
 70 See Part II.B.2, infra. 
 71 TRIPS, supra note 1, at arts. 10 (computer programs), 11 (rental rights). 
 72 In the United States, for example, computer programs are protected as of 1980.  See 
Computer Software Copyright Act 1980 § 10(b), Pub. L. No. 96–517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3024 
(Dec. 12, 1980) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 117).  The 1980 Act stated that it was meant to 
preserve the status quo, which was rather unsettled at the time.  The commercial rental 
rights are part of the right of distribution.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (“publication”); 17 
U.S.C. § 106(3).  The rental right is subject to the first sale doctrine.  17 U.S.C. § 109. 
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countries to have strong copyright laws, to protect their own 
authors and facilitate the emergence of local content industries 
(assuming that there is a causal connection between more 
copyright protection and innovation).  Presently, however, the 
beneficiaries of a strong copyright regime are foreign copyright 
owners.  These foreign copyright owners, not surprisingly, are 
almost all citizens (and corporations) of the North.73 
The third layer of TRIPS is that of enforcement.74  TRIPS 
requires member countries to provide copyright owners with civil 
and administrative procedures to enforce their rights, as well as 
criminal penalties for violations of those rights.  This might sound 
obvious, as it does not make much sense to have new laws without 
the means to enforce them.  However, this requirement means 
that countries need to allocate resources and to change their 
spending priorities according to external interests.  Indeed, IP 
police units have been established worldwide.75  Article 41(5) of 
TRIPS purports not to require this, as it states that, “[n]othing in 
this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of 
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and the enforcement of law in general.”  However, the bilateral 
commitments and unilateral measures under TRIPS render this 
article ineffective, as they require enforcement beyond TRIPS.76  A 
Brazilian commentator reported that, “[s]pecial courts and special 
forces were created to pursue [IP enforcement], even though the 
increase of budgetary and personal resources was not 
proportionately extended to other pressing needs, like fighting 
 
 73 For the various narratives of the power relationship between the North and the 
South in this context, see Yu, The First Ten Years, supra note 59. 
 74 TRIPS, supra note 1, at pt. III.  Gervais reports that the enforcement provisions of 
TRIPS were “drafted on the basis of concerns expressed by industry experts and other 
interested parties.”  GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 69. 
 75 See, e.g., Global Congress/Interpol Latin America Regional Forum on Combating 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, The Rio Declaration §§ 3-4, 6-7 (June 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Press/Rio%20Declaration%20Final%20Draft.pdf; 
Interpol, Intellectual Property (IP) Crime, 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Default.asp. 
 76 See, e.g., Office of the USTR, Final Text of the Morocco Free Trade Agreement, 
art.15.11(3), June 15, 2004, KAV 7206 (stating that “[t]he Parties understand that a 
decision that a Party makes on the distribution of enforcement resources shall not excuse 
that Party from complying with this Chapter”), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_I
ndex.html.   
  Article 17.11(2) of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement echoes TRIPS art. 
41(5) but also adds that “[t]he distribution of resources for the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights shall not excuse a Party from compliance with the provisions 
of this Article.”  Office of the USTR, Chile FTA final text, art. 17.11(2), June 6, 2003, KAV 
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drug-related crime.”77 
Local enforcement might run into various problems, 
especially when subject to a country’s international obligations, 
and even more so when the line between public interests and the 
private commercial interests of copyright owners is blurred.  Thus, 
for example, once an IP police unit is established, it might lack the 
power to determine its own priorities, as those priorities are 
dictated by external forces.  Thus, an IP police unit might, on its 
own volition, be interested in dealing with counterfeit alcoholic 
products or medicines, as these tend to be of low quality and 
dangerous.  Instead, the local IP unit may be recruited to assist 
private copyright owners in enforcing their rights in software or 
sound recordings.78  This is even more frustrating, as copyright 
owners sometimes use criminal procedures to place pressure on 
alleged infringers and to strengthen their bargaining positions in 
discussing the possible settlement of a civil dispute.  Once a 
settlement is achieved, the complaint submitted to the police is 
withdrawn.  Even if the police are interested in further 
investigating the matter, they may find that those who complained 
in the first place will no longer cooperate with them.79 
A fourth layer of TRIPS is specific to the international level 
and applies to the members of the WTO.  The WTO framework 
includes a dispute settlement system, which it considers to be a 
central pillar of its multilateral trade system.80  The dispute 
settlement system creates one mechanism of resolutions of 
violations of any of several agreements under the WTO, including 
TRIPS.81  The settlement process is intended to encourage 
negotiations of disputes among countries,82 but it also provides for 
some remedies.  The authority to decide trade disputes lies with 
 
 77 Denis Borges Barbosa, Abstract, Counting Ten for TRIPs: Author Rights and Access to 
Information – A Cockroach’s View of Encroachment (SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=842564. 
 78 See, e.g., DVIR OREN ET AL., NEW COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION FOR ISRAEL 17 (Niva Elkin-
Koren and Michael Birnhack eds., 2004) (Hebrew), available at 
http://techlaw.haifa.ac.il/papers/copyright_seminar.pdf (regarding a report, based on a 
public statement of the legal advisor of the Israeli IP police unit). 
 79 Id. at 180.  Thus, for example, in its response to the 2006 USTR Report, the Israeli 
government complained that “[l]ack of cooperation from rights holders continues to 
prevent the successful prosecution of some criminal matters.” Submission of the 
Government of Israel to the USTR with Respect to the 2006 Special 301 Review, at 3 (on 
file with author). 
 80 WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, at art. 3(2) (Apr. 15, 1994), available at 
http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm; WTO, Marrakesh Declaration 
of 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/marrakesh_decl_e.htm [hereinafter DSU].  
Article 64 of TRIPS subjects it to the DSU. 
 81 Other WTO agreements refer to goods and services. 
 82 DSU, supra note 80, at art. 4. 
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the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is the WTO’s 
General Council.  In practice, the disputes are decided by special 
panels, which make recommendations to the DSB.83  A panel’s 
recommendation is accepted, unless there is a consensus against it.  
Thus, the panels enjoy tremendous power.84  This rule is the 
opposite of the previous dispute settlement system under GATT.85 
A country that loses a dispute is required to amend its 
violating policy in order to bring it into conformity with the WTO 
agreement.86  If this option is impractical, or if the losing country 
does not comply, the losing country should enter into negotiations 
with the complaining country in order to seek a resolution.87  Such 
resolution is not generally in the form of direct monetary 
compensation; rather, it takes the form of some comparable 
measure, such as a trade retaliation, by which tariffs imposed on 
goods imported from the complaining country would be reduced.  
Failure of such negotiations might result in trade sanctions 
imposed on the losing country.  The sanctions are structured in a 
hierarchical manner, so that the first priority is to impose 
sanctions in the same sector as the one in dispute.  If this is 
impractical or ineffective, sanctions will be imposed under 
another WTO agreement.88  This is how a dispute between 
Ecuador and the European Union over quotas of bananas resulted 
in a remedy in the copyright sector.89  Intellectual property is thus 
treated as just another kind of goods. 
d. WIPO Copyright Treaty – The WCT 
TRIPS is not the only mechanism to globalize IP rights.  
WIPO, perhaps fearing that TRIPS would render it irrelevant, and 
perhaps driven by powerful industries, initiated amendments to 
 
 83 Id. at arts. 6-15 (establishing the panels and determining their procedures); art. 17 
(regarding appellate review). 
 84 Id. at arts. 16, 17(14). 
 85 See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, A Unique Contribution, 
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 
2006). 
 86 DSU, supra note 80, at art. 19. 
 87 Okediji argues that this system allows stronger countries to bypass the rule-based 
system of global copyright and replace the judicial-like processes of the DSU with 
diplomacy.  Thus, stronger countries are able to “bargain down” their TRIPS obligations.  
See Okediji, supra note 7, at 634. 
 88 DSU, supra note 80, at art. 22(3). 
 89 See Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, WT/DS27/RWECU (Apr. 12, 
1999).  The report found that the European Community violated its commitments under 
the WTO.  See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes 
(July 13, 2001), http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/stplay_e.doc.  Eventually, 
Ecuador did not pursue this remedy.  For a discussion of the case, see Marco Bronckers & 
Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101, 105 
(2005). 
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the Berne Convention, which culminated in the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT).90  Like TRIPS, the WCT incorporates the 
Berne Convention and further expands both the subject matter of 
copyright law and the accompanying bundle of rights.  But the 
WCT expansions go beyond TRIPS.  Most notably, article 11 of the 
WCT requires contracting countries to provide “adequate legal 
protection . . . against the circumvention of effective technological 
measures,” or, in other words, to provide a protection for Digital 
Rights Managements (DRMs).91 
Currently, as of September, 2006, the WCT is less popular 
than TRIPS and includes sixty contracting parties,92 in contrast to 
the WTO’s one hundred and forty-nine members.  The reason for 
its lack of popularity is probably because the sole subject of the 
WCT is copyright law.  The WCT does not link trade benefits, or 
any other benefits, to the copyright deal.  Although many 
countries have joined the WCT, there might be another 
explanation for the WTC’s lack of popularity: bilateralism. 
2. Bilateral Agreements 
The multilateral trade treaties of TRIPS and the WCT were 
justified in their goal of harmonizing copyright laws around the 
world, especially in a world where creative works easily cross 
borders.93  From these multilateral agreements, however, a web of 
IP-related bilateral agreements has emerged.  In these agreements, 
such as the Free Trade Agreements discussed above, TRIPS 
generally serves as a baseline, and the owners of IP rights are 
granted more rights and fewer exceptions or limitations than they 
would have under TRIPS.94  Thus, through a process of global 
 
 90 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 
65 (1997), at art. 1(1), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html [hereinafter WCT].  More 
precisely, the WCT is a “special agreement” within the meaning  of article 20 of the Berne 
Convention.  See id. at art. 1(1). 
 91 DRM is a generic term, referring to various technological measures which are 
designed to control access to a digital work and/or the uses thereof.  The access control 
measures can range from simple passwords to complex identification procedures.  Usage-
control measures can be designed to limit, for example, the number of times a text 
document can be printed, saved, or whether it is possible to copy portions thereof.  DRM 
is thus a self-help measure.  The WCT provides owners of creative works with legal 
protection of these self-help measures. 
  This section of the WCT served the United States content industries by convincing 
Congress to enact the anti-circumvention rules in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006) [hereinafter DMCA].  See generally Pamela 
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED 4.01 (1996), available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html. 
 92 See WIPO, Contracting Parties: WCT, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Sep. 
22, 2006). 
 93 See id. 
 94 Negotiating, supra note 7, at 172-74. 
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“ratcheting up,”95 a new layer of IP law has been constructed.  
These bilateral agreements result in a “TRIPS-Plus” regime.96  This 
mechanism of bilateralism is especially troubling when the parties 
have unequal power, as in the case of the United States97 and the 
European Union,98 and their less powerful trade partners. 
For example, in all of its recent FTAs, the United States 
includes similar language, addressing the exclusive reproduction 
rights granted to authors in literary and artistic works.  The United 
States-Chile FTA states, in part, that “[e]ach party shall provide 
that authors of literary and artistic works have the right to 
authorize or prohibit all reproductions of their works, in any 
manner or form, permanent or temporary (including temporary 
storage in electronic form).”99 
The requirement to include temporary storage is not 
addressed in TRIPS and is a controversial addition thereto.  Courts 
in the United States have found that the temporary copying that 
occurs in the context of transmitting information over the 
Internet is sufficiently “fixed” to be considered “copying” for the 
purposes of copyright law.100  The European Union, however, 
 
 95 See Peter Drahos, Securing The Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners 
And Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53, 55 (2004) 
(describing the process in which bilateral agreements ratchet up the level of intellectual 
property protection). 
 96 Peter Yu suggests that we distinguish between various kinds of provisions, such as 
TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra.  This is a useful distinction, though for rhetorical purposes I 
will not apply it here.  Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2007). 
 97 For a critical discussion in the context of data exclusivity in the pharmaceutical 
industry, see Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism In Intellectual Property: Defeating The WTO System 
For Access To Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004) (examining the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement). 
 98 For a discussion of the European Union and the TRIPS plus strategy, which is 
applied mostly in the fields of trademark and geographical indications, see Willem 
Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?, in GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS, 183, 194 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002). 
 99 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76.  With variations as to the addressees of the right, 
see also The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248, 
at art. 17.4(1) [hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA], available at  
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_I
ndex.html; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.5(1), June 15, 2004, 44 
I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA] (regarding the reproduction of performances 
and phonograms); United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 
544, at art. 14.4(1) (regarding the reproduction, performances of phonograms) 
[hereinafter U.S.-Bahrain FTA], available at http://www.ustr. 
gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html.  The 
United States-Jordan FTA includes by reference articles one through fourteen of the 
WCT, and adds also that temporary reproductions should be protected.  See United States-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 24, 2000, 44 I.L.M. 63art. 4(1)(c), 4(10), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5
112.pdf. 
 100 The origin of this view is in a non-network setting.  See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loading of software from 
the Read Only Memory of a computer to its Random Access Memory is a “copy” under the 
Copyright Act).  The specific ruling in MAI regarding machine maintenance was 
  
2006] GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, LOCAL SPEECH 515 
reached the opposite conclusion, allowing member states to 
exempt temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or 
incidental or which are an integral and essential part of a 
technological process, as long as certain conditions are met.101  
The United States-Chile FTA includes a similar exemption,102 but 
other recent FTAs, such as that between the United States and 
Australia, do not.103 
Other examples of TRIPS-plus obligations are that parties to 
the FTA must not only provide authors the exclusive right to make 
their works available to the public,104 but also, the parties to the 
FTA are obligated to create anti-circumvention rules.105  These two 
obligations are required by the WCT, but not by TRIPS.106  
Australia and Morocco, for example, committed in their FTAs with 
the United States to enact DMCA-like statutes, even though they 
have not ratified the WCT.107  This is a clear example of a bilateral 
mechanism which expands copyright protection beyond TRIPS.  
While some FTAs faced local opposition, they were signed in the 
end.108 
Bilateral agreements should be assessed within their political 
and global contexts.  Each bilateral agreement has its own unique 
character, which reflects the political, cultural, or other 
relationship between the contracting countries.  The United 
States-Israel bilateral agreements, for example, reflect the close 
political and financial ties between those two countries.109  IP 
 
overruled by Congress in 17 U.S.C. § 117(c).  The general rule that temporary copying 
amounts to “copying” under the Copyright Act remains, however, and was applied in the 
context of the Internet.  See also Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999). 
 101 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 274) 33 (EC) (regarding the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society). 
 102 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76, at art. 17.7(3) n.17. 
 103 See U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99. 
 104 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76, at art. 17.5(3); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99, 
at art. 17.4(2); U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 99, at art. 14.4(2); U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra 
note 99, at art. 15.5(3). 
 105 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76, at art. 17.7(5); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99, 
at art. 17.4(7); U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 99, at art. 14.4(7); U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra 
note 99, at art. 15.5(8). 
 106 See WCT, supra note 90, at art. 6 (regarding making works available), art. 11 
(regarding anti-circumvention rules). 
 107 See U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99, at art. 17.4(7); U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 
99, at art. 15.5(8). Morocco is required, under the FTA, to ratify the WCT.  See WCT, supra 
note 90, at art. 15.1(2)(g). 
 108 See, e.g., Peter Martin, The FTAS Clause that Stifles Creativity, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Apr. 14, 2004 (regarding the opposition in Australia to copyright aspects of the 
U.S.-Australia FTA), available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/13/1081838720006.html. 
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bilateral agreements are better understood as part of the 
globalization of IP.  Bilateral agreements both rely on the current 
global level and serve as the basis for the next wave of global IP 
law.  They are part of the process of the ratcheting-up of IP law. 
3. Unilateral Measures 
Unilateral measures provide a powerful means to expand IP 
rights.  One such measure is found in section 301 of the United 
States Trade Act of 1974, as amended in 1984.  A procedure 
known as “special 301 review”110 empowers United States Trade 
Representatives (USTR) to examine the level of protection 
accorded to American-owned intellectual property in countries 
with which the United States has trade relations.  The USTR 
publishes its report once a year, an act which worries quite a few 
trade ministries around the world.111  Countries are categorized in 
the USTR publication by placement on one of several lists: Priority 
Foreign Country, Priority Watch List, and Watch List.  
Classification as a Priority Foreign Country, considered to be the 
worst category, might result in trade sanctions, and classification 
in any list is likely to result in heavy political pressure.  The Trade 
Act was amended to enable the USTR to reach a finding that a 
country’s IP protection is inadequate, even if the country is TRIPS 
compliant.112  This is a powerful TRIPS-plus mechanism: even if a 
country is TRIPS compliant, the USTR may require it to do 
more.113 
The 301 review process requires extensive resources, which 
the United States government lacks.  But there are those who are 
happy to offer assistance – the content industries.  The 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a powerful 
coalition of United States copyright-based industries, is actively 
involved in this process, as it collects and analyzes the data that 
 
 110 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2114(c), 2411).  The European Union has a similar mechanism, 
but one which has several safeguards aimed to prevent abuse.  See Stephen Woolcock, 
European Union Trade Policy: Domestic Institutions and Systematic Factors, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 234, 242-43 (Dominic Kelly & Wyn 
Grant eds., 2005). 
 111 See, e.g., USTR 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (Apr. 2006), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Specia
l_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter 2006 REPORT]. 
 112 Trade Act § 301(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A)).  See 
generally 4 NIMMER, supra note 68, § 18.04[A]. 
 113 The “301 process” was challenged by the European Commission under the WTO’s 
DSU.  See Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (finding that section 301 does not violate the DSU but that 
it must be applied in accordance therewith).  See Lina M. Montén, The Inconsistency between 
Section 301 and TRIPS: Counterproductive with Respect to the Future of International Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 387 (2005). 
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forms the basis of the annual 301 Report.114  In fact, in the political 
sense, the American copyright industry has captured the USTR.115  
4. A Web of Global Copyright 
TRIPS transcended the Berne Convention’s international 
foundations and created a global copyright regime, but the WCT 
and the accompanying web of bilateral agreements and unilateral 
measures have further raised the standard of copyright protection.  
In light of the dynamic nature of G©, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that there will soon be a new call to harmonize copyright 
law around the world, and the new global standard will be akin to 
that of the bilateral agreements and unilateral measures.  
Professor Daniel Gervais, a leading scholar of global IP, estimates 
that the current state of reviews, negotiations, and politics might 
lead to a “TRIPS II” Agreement.116  Alternatively, as the South now 
has a better understanding of the dynamics of G© law (and of 
global IP law in general), one commentator has observed an 
attempt by developing countries to halt the expansion of IP rights 
and restore balance by shifting the international IP regimes out of 
the WTO and into other international organizations.117  The 
Development Agenda, mentioned in Part I of this article, is a 
promising step in this direction, in that it offers an alternative to 
the expansionist agenda of IP law and emphasizes the public 
interest in access to knowledge.118  For now, the new G© is the 
regime in place, and an exploration of the nature and essence of 
this form of copyright law is due. 
D. The Nature of Global Copyright 
What does it mean that copyright is globalized?  This Part 
outlines the nature of G© and argues that G© is not a unified 
body of law, but rather is a complex web of inter-related layers of 
international law applied locally within the existing legal, political, 
and cultural environment.  This local application renders the idea 
of a unified global law a fiction.  This Part further argues that G© 
lacks a coherent underlying philosophical theory, and that 
copyright protection has been reincarnated as a means of trade. 
 
 114 IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
 115 See Drahos, supra note 7, at 173; Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 55, at 90-99.  It 
should be noted that the content industries are not alone in capturing the regulators.  
Pharmaceutical companies have tremendous power over these governmental agencies. 
 116 See GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 48. 
 117 See Helfer, supra note 53. 
 118 See supra note 11.  See Pedro de Paranagua Moniz, Abstract, The Development Agenda 
for WIPO: Another Stillbirth? A Battle Between Access to Knowledge and Enclosure (Getulio Vargas 
Foundation 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=844366. 
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1. Global Harmonization and Local Application 
The term “G©,” as used in this article, does not mean a supra-
national law that supersedes local laws.  The international G© 
instruments require adherence to certain common principles and 
occasionally to specific legal requirements, but they also allow 
some flexibility.119  Countries that have implemented TRIPS, the 
WCT or a TRIPS-plus regime, have done so locally, within the 
structure of their own legal systems.  Local application might lead 
to differences in the law among member states, but the WTO’s 
unique system of dispute resolution guarantees adherence to the 
minimum standards.  Strong countries, however, often get away 
with noncompliant statutes.120  G© thus narrows the differences 
between the IP-enforcement schemes of different countries, but it 
does not completely eliminate them. 
Differing interpretations of the originality requirement for 
copyright protection illustrate this point.  As the originality 
requirement was not defined by the Berne Convention, TRIPS or 
the WCT, it has been left to local interpretation.  The United 
States, for example, emphasizes the origin of a work and requires 
a tiny bit of creativity,121 while in the United Kingdom, the 
originality requirement may be fulfilled by showing that labor and 
skill went into the work’s creation.122  Canadian law requires that 
the author exercise skill and judgment in the origination of the 
work, but it leaves aside the requirement of creativity.123  Israeli 
case law declares theoretical adherence to the American 
interpretation of originality, but in practice, the Israeli 
 
 119 TRIPS states that “[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice.”  TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 1. 
 120 See Okediji, supra note 7.  The most striking example is the DSU’s finding that the 
United States violated TRIPS by enacting the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (FIMLA), 17 
U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006), which exempts small businesses such as restaurants and bars from 
liability when they play the radio or television in their public venue.  Panel Report, United 
States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (finding that 
section 110(5)(B) violates U.S. obligations under TRIPS).  For an analysis of the decision, 
see Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three Step Test, 25 COLUM. J. L. 
& ARTS 119 (2002). 
  The Dispute was instigated by the European Commission, following a complaint by 
IMRO.  Despite this finding, the United States did not amend the Copyright Act so as to 
conform with the WTO decision.  Rather, an arbitration procedure was initiated under 
the WTO, which resulted in a finding that the annual damage to the European 
Community from the U.S. lack of compliance. is 1,219,900 Euros.  Award of the 
Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration under 
Article 25 of the DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 121 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 122 Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1918] 2 Ch. 601, 608-09. 
 123 See The Law Society of Upper Canada v. CCH Canadian Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 
(Can.).  See also Yo’av Mazeh, Canadian Originality and the Tension Between the Commonwealth 
and the American Standards for Copyright Protection – The Myth of Tele-Direct, 16 I.P.J. 561 
(2003) (discussing Canadian originality before The Law Society of Upper Canada case). 
  
2006] GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, LOCAL SPEECH 519 
interpretation of originality appears more closely related to the 
British view.124  French law takes a completely different tactic and 
requires that the work reflect the author’s personality.125  The 
fundamental originality principle of copyright law is thus subject 
to vastly divergent interpretations. 
Another example of local flexibility within the G© regime lies 
in the permitted exceptions to copyright protection.  United 
States copyright law enumerates several specific exceptions,126 but 
it also leaves open the fair use standard, which provides for 
flexibility at the expense of foreseeability and certainty.127  While 
copyright law in European Union countries also allows for 
exceptions, it requires these exceptions to meet a rather vague 
“three step test.”128  Such allowed exceptions are: (1) limited to 
special cases, (2) may not conflict with the normal exploitation of 
the work, and (3) may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interest of the right holder.  This test is not new to international 
copyright law.129  Although the test sounds vague, its narrow 
interpretation130 stands in contrast to the broad application of the 
United States fair use defense.  In fact, several United States trade 
partners have even questioned whether the United States fair use 
doctrine complies with the three-step test.131 
Doctrinal differences in copyright law across various 
 
 124 See CA 2790, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron [2000], 54(3) P.D. 817.  I have provided 
an unofficial translation of the Hebrew.  Dead Sea Scrolls, 
http://lawatch.haifa.ac.il/heb/month/dead_sea.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). 
  The case addressed the controversy regarding the Dead Sea Scrolls.  The court 
found that a scholar who deciphered the ancient text is entitled to the copyright of the 
deciphered text, even though the original author of the text is unknown, and has been 
dead for at least 2000 years.  For a discussion of the case and the issue of originality, see 
Michael D. Birnhack, The Dead Sea Scrolls Case: Who Is an Author?, 23 E.I.P.R. 128 (2001). 
 125 See Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality 
in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPY. SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 968-70 (2002) (analyzing the originality 
requirement in French copyright law, Gervais argues that despite the different 
interpretations of the requirement of originality in various jurisdictions, there is an 
emerging international consensus about the test, which is based on identifying the 
creative choices made by the author). 
 126 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-122 (2006). 
 127 Id. § 107. 
 128 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC). 
 129 See TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 13 (echoing article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, 
which was limited to exceptions to reproduction rights).  TRIPS extends the three-step 
test to all the rights included in the copyright bundle of rights.  For discussion of the test 
in general, see MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE STEP 
TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 
(2004), and especially the discussion of TRIPS at 83-91.  Thus far, only one DSU panel has 
addressed the test in its ruling on 17 U.S.C. §110(5).  See supra note 120. 
 130 See GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 144-47 (arguing that the three-step test limits the 
member states’ ability to create new exceptions, such as for compulsory licenses). 
 131 See Ruth Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 75, 115-17 (2000)) [hereinafter Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Doctrine] 
(discussing challenges made by Australia, New Zealand, and the European Community to 
the compatibility of the fair use doctrine and TRIPS article 13). 
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jurisdictions may also stem from each country’s legal history.  In 
the United Kingdom, copyright law resulted from the shared 
desire of the Crown and the Publishers’ Guild to control the 
creation and dissemination of publications.132  Each party had its 
own reasons for wanting control, but they joined forces, and the 
result was the emergence of copyright law almost three hundred 
years ago.133  The political setting was accompanied by a mixed 
theory which justified copyright both as an instrument to achieve a 
goal (as the 1710 Statute of Anne declared, it was an act for the 
“encouragement of learning”) and as an end in itself, based on a 
Lockean theory of labor.  The latter also explains the United 
Kingdom concept of originality, which holds that the investment 
of labor is sufficient to recognize originality and award 
copyright.134 
The United States inherited English copyright law, but the 
United States Constitution transformed it from a tool of control to 
a public interest tool, intended “to promote the progress of 
science.”135  This regulatory view of copyright replaced the 
proprietary tones of the English law.136  Congress acknowledged 
the primacy of the public over the author in the copyright 
scheme,137 which resulted in a generous interpretation of the fair 
use defense and the absence of moral rights at the federal level.  
This preference for the public has appeared to change in recent 
years, however, as copyright owners (not necessarily the authors) 
have gained power and lobbied to change the laws to bring 
greater benefit to themselves.138 
European countries like France and Germany adopted a 
different theory of copyright law, which positions the author at the 
center of the discussion and seeks to protect the author’s dignity 
and autonomy.139  Any benefits to the public are considered to be a 
positive side effect, but these are not the direct goal of European 
copyright law.  To the extent that the public’s interests conflict 
with those of the authors, the law contains exceptions that attempt 
 
 132 See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760-1911 (1999). 
 133 See CPYRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY: A HISTORY 1403–1959 (1960); 
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28 (1968). 
 134 The leading case on the matter is University of London Press, Ltd. v. University 
Tutorial Press, Ltd.., [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 608-09. 
 135 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 136 See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); 
PATTERSON, supra note 133. 
 137 See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). 
 138 See LITMAN, supra note 53 passim. 
 139 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View, in COPYRIGHT AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 50 (Paul Torremans ed., 2004) [hereinafter Birnhack, Copyrighting 
Speech]. 
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to reconcile the conflicting interests.  These exceptions, however, 
are considered a compromise of the authors’ rights: they result 
from the imposition of external forces and do not reflect some 
inherent balance within copyright law.140  Here too, copyright law 
should be located within its particular historic setting and political 
background.141 
Other countries have hybrid copyright laws, in terms of their 
underlying goals, rationales, and the interests and rights they 
purport to fulfill.  The Israeli copyright law, for example, was first 
introduced into the region in 1924 by the British government that 
ruled Palestine under the United Nations Mandate (1917-1948).  
The law that was implemented in 1924 was a modified version of 
the 1911 English Copyright Act, accompanied by an ordinance, 
which was a common form of primary legislation that the British 
enforced in their colonies.  When the State of Israel was 
established in 1948, the British Acts were incorporated into Israeli 
law,142 and in 1950, Israel joined Berne.143 
The Copyright Act of 1911 and the Copyright Ordinance of 
1924 have been amended by the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset), 
but, in spite of their cumbersome language and poor translation 
into Hebrew, both still remain in force and are of equal status.  
Some of the amendments to the Ordinance, such as the 1989 
amendment affording protection to computer programs,144 merely 
reflect technological advances, but others are implementations of 
international commitments.  Most notable is the 1981 amendment 
to the Ordinance, adding moral rights for authors.145  The 
resulting law is thus a mixture of various theoretical strands, with 
English law forming the basis upon which Continental ideas have 
 
 140 Id. at 54. 
 141 Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary 
France, 1777-1793, in 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (Robert Post ed., 1990); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TULANE L. 
REV. 991 (1990).  
 142 Interestingly, although the 1991 Act was translated into Hebrew, the official 
language thereof remains English.  The title of the copyright act was not translated into 
Hebrew until 1953, and it was written in Hebrew as the phonetic spelling of the word 
“copyright.”  The 1953 Amendment replaced this with the term Zchuyot Yotsrim, which 
means “author’s rights,” or droit d’auteur.  See Copyright Act (Amendment) of 1953, LSI 38.  
This seemingly technical change reflects a deeper change towards a continental copyright 
mindset. 
 143 See About WIPO: Treaties and Contracting Parties, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=972C (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).  
In 2003, Israel ratified the Paris Amendment to the Berne Convention.  See id.  In 1955, 
Israel joined the Universal Copyright Convention.  See Universal Copyright Convention, 
http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=15381&language=E (last visited Sept. 21, 
2006). 
 144 See § 2A of the Copyright Ordinance, 1924, 1 Hukey Eretz Israel 364, amended by 
Copyright Act of 1989, LSI 300, amend. 5.  
 145 See § 4A of the Copyright Ordinance, 1924, as amended in 1981. 
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been added.  To complicate the matter further, Israeli courts 
often find inspiration in and guidance from the United States law, 
as the Israeli Supreme Court did when it based its interpretation 
of the originality requirement on Feist.146  The Israeli Court also 
read the four United States fair use factors into the English fair-
dealing exception, which is part of Israeli law.147  The resulting law 
is an interesting, albeit messy, hybrid.148 
All of the countries discussed thus far have copyright laws that 
originated before the current global regime came into being.  But 
many countries new to copyright law, or those that changed their 
laws in order to adhere to international commitments, do not 
have a deep-rooted tradition of copyright law.149  Whether the lack 
of tradition is due to a lag in the country’s legal system in general, 
or due to the fact that copyright was never a top priority for 
governments kept busy by more fundamental issues like poverty 
and hunger, or whether it resulted from a socialist/communist 
past, or a different conception of the creative process, this lack of 
tradition has led these countries to adopt the high level of 
copyright protection found in the North.  The case of Indonesia, 
discussed below, is one example of such a country.  Many 
countries joined the WTO because of the benefits it was supposed 
to provide to their economies in other fields.  It was only later, 
when there was no turning back, that these countries found 
themselves under international obligations in the IP field.  While 
most of these countries were not part of the negotiations leading 
to the inclusion of IP rights in the WTO framework, and while few 
of them have a firm legal concept of private property or 
intellectual property, they are forced, in the name of 
“harmonization,” to adopt the same or similar laws as countries 
with vastly different histories and needs.  For certain less 
developed countries, this is not just a step forward, but rather a 
giant leap toward an unknown future. 
The Indonesian example is telling.150  Indonesia, classified by 
 
 146 CA 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Lines Bros. SA [2001] 48(4) P.D. 133, 166 
[Hebrew] (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (rejecting 
“sweat of the brow” as an interpretation of the originality requirement). 
 147 CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Inc., [1993] 48(1) P.D. 251 [Hebrew]. 
 148 This is further complicated by the so-called “constitutional revolution” in Israeli law 
in 1992, which declared the right to private property to be of constitutional magnitude.  
Several courts stated that copyright law is intellectual property, hence property, and thus 
it deserves constitutional protection.  See, e.g., C.A. 6141/02 Acu”m v. I.D.F. Radio, 57(2) 
P.D. 625 [2003] [Hebrew]. 
 149 The 2006 REPORT, supra note 111, included an appendix listing “Developments in 
Intellectual Property Protection” for the years 2003-2004.  Examples of countries that 
implemented new copyright laws or have amended their laws to fit international 
commitments include (chronologically): Kazakhstan, Morocco, Algeria, Andorra, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Chile. 
 150 See Simon Butt, Intellectual Property in Indonesia: A Problematic Legal Transplant, 24 
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the World Bank as a “lower-middle income economy” and 
“severely indebted,”151 based its system of copyright on Dutch 
copyright law, which became Indonesian law upon the 
establishment of the state in 1945.  Indonesia changed its laws 
several times, most recently in 2003, under pressure from the 
United States.152  Simon Butt, who studied the Indonesian IP 
regime, reported a major gap between the law on the books and 
the reality of copyright protection, which led him to describe 
Indonesia (in 2002) as “an intellectual piracy haven.”153  In its 2005 
Report, the USTR placed Indonesia on its Priority Watch list,154 
stating that the “U.S. copyright industry estimated losses in 
Indonesia of approximately $197.5 million in 2004.” 
Although Indonesia has remained on the Priority Watch List 
in 2006, the USTR commended it for improvements in 
enforcement and instructed it on additional measures it would be 
expected to undertake.  This was coupled with a clear signal that 
the “United States will continue to use the bilateral Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement process to work with Indonesia 
to improve its IP enforcement regime.”155  Indonesia is thus 
moving closer to adopting United States-inspired copyright laws, 
but certain realities may prevent it from ever reaching true 
harmonization with the United Sates standard.156 
Another major reason for the lack of complete 
harmonization of copyright laws around the world is the legal 
environment that surrounds and impacts copyright law in each 
individual country.157  Each country has its own body of laws, and 
some of those, like antitrust law, property law, constitutional law 
and free speech jurisprudence, may affect the development of 
 
E.I.P.R. 2429 (2002). 
 151 See The World Bank: Data and Statistics for Country Groups, 
http://tinyurl.com/9p6kf (last visited Aug. 31, 2006). 
 152 See Assafa Endeshaw, Intellectual Property Enforcement in Asia: A Reality Check, 13 INT’L 
J.L. & INFO. TECH. 378, 381 (2005) (quoting the Indonesian Minister of Justice 
acknowledging the fear of U.S. sanctions as the motivation to enact IP legislation). 
 153 Id. 
 154 See USTR 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 28 (MAY 2005), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Specia
l_301/asset_upload_file195_7636.pdf. 
 155 See 2006 REPORT, supra note 111, at 28-29. 
 156 Butt lists many reasons for the failure of enforcing the IP regime in Indonesia: 
increased IP protection would have little effect on Indonesians and the country’s 
economy, as foreign investors are seeking stability, not IP laws; enforcement would result 
in increased prices, beyond the reach of many local users, such as students in universities; 
piracy is a source of employment; lack of public funding, private capital and technology 
mean that IP laws are unlikely to result in local innovation; lack of reciprocity; 
appropriation of traditional knowledge; and customary law which rejects Western 
concepts of private property.  Other reasons are inadequate police and a corrupt 
judiciary.  See Butt, supra note 150, at 432-37.  However, as the USTR indicated in its 2006 
Report, it seems that enforcement has somewhat increased.  2006 REPORT, supra note 111. 
 157 See TRIPS-ROUND II, supra note 10. 
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copyright law.  Thus, even if all countries had adopted the exact 
same copyright act, there would still be divergence in the laws. 
This Part has shown that, despite the attempts to harmonize 
copyright law, and despite many common international core 
principles, there are inherent differences in the local 
interpretation and application of the law, and these differences 
are unlikely to disappear in the near future.  Although the road to 
harmonization appears imminent, there is still a long way to go 
before a unified global copyright law becomes reality, and there is 
ample time to question whether this is, in fact, the appropriate 
road to be taken. 
In light of the differences between local copyright laws, 
adherence to a common philosophical understanding behind 
copyright in general might ease tensions between countries, even 
if it cannot completely erase such tensions.  The following Part 
searches for a theoretical common ground. 
2. Philosophical Justifications 
Is there a coherent philosophical justification for copyright 
law in the various international and global instruments?  The G© 
regime is a hybrid of various strands.  In the spirit of the law of the 
United States, G© has an instrumental undertone, but it also has 
pronounced overtones of the proprietary, or natural rights, view.  
In other words, it is difficult at this point to identify a singular 
underlying philosophy of G©. 
For example, the thin protection awarded to databases in the 
international instruments reflects the United States view of 
copyright law.  Both TRIPS and the WCT require that 
compilations of data are protected if the “selection and 
arrangement” of their contents constitute “intellectual creations,” 
and they clarify that protection does not extend to the data itself.  
This standard is based on the Berne Convention158 and is in line 
with the United States Supreme Court’s view of copyright law, as 
stated in Feist, which explicitly rejected the labor theory of 
copyright law.159 
Moral rights, on the other hand, reflect a Hegelian theory, 
which emphasize the personal connection between an author and 
his or her work.160  Moral rights usually ensure that a work is 
attributed to the author and that the integrity of the work is 
 
 158 See Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 2(5). 
 159 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 160 See André Françon & Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors’ Rights in France: The Moral Right of the 
Creator of a Commissioned Work to Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9 
COLUM. -VLA J.L. & ARTS 381 (1985). 
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protected.  Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires the 
protection of moral rights, but this section is explicitly omitted 
from TRIPS.161  The WCT, on the other hand, incorporates most 
of the Berne Convention, including article 6bis.162 
In some cases, the G© regime is imposed onto existing 
copyright law in a country that may have already chosen one 
philosophical justification, resulting in a mixture of justifications 
for the law; some rules are then explained by reference to one 
theory, other rules by reference to a second theory, and so on.  
Furthermore, where copyright law is imposed on a country that 
did not previously have copyright protection, the absence of local 
legal history leaves courts and other interpreters of the law without 
an important analytical and interpretive tool.  The result is that 
G© is void of an underlying philosophy.163 
There are at least two situations in which it is important to 
determine the underlying philosophy or rationale of copyright 
law.  The first is in common law jurisdictions, where the judiciary 
has the power to interpret statutes, rather than just apply them.  In 
this type of system, the courts often try to understand the rationale 
of the rule to be interpreted.  Statutes, as written, often require 
construction or explication, and in some cases, they conflict with 
other legislation, or even with a country’s constitution.  Hence, 
interpretation is inevitable.  Depending on the interpretive mode 
of the country’s legal system and the extent to which the 
interpretive methodology allows for an examination of more than 
the strict language of the statute, the judicial analysis may include 
policy considerations, legislative intent (original or otherwise),164 
or legislative purpose (subjective or objective).165  Under such legal 
conditions, the philosophical justification of copyright law is a 
relevant factor in its interpretation.166 
When there is no coherent rationale for the law, however, a 
court-imposed, ex-post interpretation might explain and provide 
 
 161 See Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 6bis; TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 9(1).  
The omission of moral rights from TRIPS was a result of U.S. objections.  See GERVAIS, 
supra note 54, at 124-25. 
 162 See WCT, supra note 90, at art. 1(4). 
 163 For a similar argument in regard to patent law, see Samuel Oddi, TRIPS – Natural 
Rights and a ‘Polite Form of Economic Imperialism,’ 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996) 
(analyzing the TRIPS articles on patents and arguing that there are some articles that can 
be explained under natural rights theory, despite the pre-TRIPS instrumentalist views.  
Oddi further attempts to explain other TRIPS rules based on various economic theories.  
The big picture is clear: there is a theoretical mixture.). 
 164 Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION – FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), with RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1985). 
 165 See, e.g., R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (landmark Canadian case).  
See generally AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (2005). 
 166 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (describing copyright’s “economic 
philosophy”). 
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instruction for the best application of some, but not all rules.  
Until and unless a coherent theory emerges from these types of 
judicial decisions, the absence of an ex-ante justification leaves the 
copyright regime without philosophical roots and prevents it from 
growing on solid theoretical ground.  When legislation is adopted 
solely due to international pressure, as in the case of IP laws in 
many developing countries and LDCs, the legislation is purely 
instrumental, and is enacted to serve the country’s political agenda 
in its international relations.  The underlying philosophical 
rationale sought by the judiciary might be elusive at best or 
artificial at worst. 
The second situation where the underlying rationale is 
relevant is where different philosophical theories may lead to 
contradictory results, thus requiring a choice to be made as to 
which rationale is preferable.  Consider, for example, the concept 
of originality, already mentioned above.  Under an instrumentalist 
view, the labor invested in the creation of a database is irrelevant 
to the recognition of copyright.  The only relevant factor is 
whether recognition of copyright will promote or impede the 
public interest.  This type of cost-benefit analysis is only possible 
under an instrumentalist view of copyright law, i.e., where 
copyright is understood as a means to an end.  Under a Lockean 
labor theory, however, the investment of labor is sufficient 
grounds for legal protection.  In the 1991 Feist case, the United 
States made a clear choice between the theories, and once such a 
choice was made, the practical conclusion was clear.167  However, 
countries lacking a solid tradition of copyright law also lack an 
available rationale to inform them, when faced with the task of 
adapting the law to conform to databases -- or in fact, to take into 
account any new issue. 
The current difficulty in identifying a coherent philosophical 
justification for G© may be viewed as merely a transitional 
problem, which will be resolved with some patience and time for 
adjustment.  This is unlikely the case, however, as the globalization 
of copyright law has proven to be an ongoing process rather than 
a single dramatic event.  As discussed above, copyright law is 
continually expanding, and the interplay between the multilateral, 
bilateral and unilateral measures has created a structure that 
consistently pushes for ever greater levels of copyright protection.  
Thus, although it lacks a coherent underlying philosophy, G© 
does serve a particular ideology: the ideology of trade. 
 
 167 The Supreme Court rejected “sweat of the brow” as the meaning of the originality 
requirement, and interpreted the requirement to mean that the origin of the work is the 
author, with an addition of creativity. 
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3. Global Copyright as Trade 
What is an ideology of trade?  The WTO encapsulates this 
ideology by stating that “[i]ts main function is to ensure that trade 
flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.”168  A refined 
question should be, therefore, what is wrong with an ideology of 
trade as applied to IP?169  After all, if IP protection is needed to 
provide authors and investors with sufficient incentives to produce 
creative works, and if those creative works serve the public good, 
then the ease with which such works can be copied across borders 
is a problem that begs a solution.  Without efficient, worldwide 
protection of copyrighted works, the gap in the system might 
widen into a destructive trap.  The argument in favor of the 
harmonization of copyright laws around the world, at least insofar 
as they relate to trade, presents one potential solution.  This is the 
argument that copyright protection should be recognized across 
borders and vigorously enforced, in order to prevent any one 
place from becoming a piracy haven.  “Free trade” in this context 
does not refer to the free flow of copyrighted works across 
borders, as it might in the context of goods.  Rather, “free trade,” 
in the context of copyright, requires the legal foundations of a 
market to be created.  Once these foundations, such as property 
rights and contract law, are established, the market will be able to 
function on its own. 
G© is now administered through a trade organization, which, 
as the TRIPS acronym suggests, naturally focuses on the trade-
related aspects of IP.170  TRIPS does not shy away from the trade 
ideology, as its preamble states: “Desiring to reduce distortions 
and impediments to international trade, and taking into account 
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. . . .”171 
The very inclusion of intangible property (IP) in the 
framework of international trade means that IP, in a practical 
sense, is equated to tangible property or goods.  TRIPS has tied 
the old economy to the new economy.  Those countries that relied 
 
 168 WTO in Brief, 
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2006). 
 169 For a defense of the trade-perspective of creative works, see Alberto Bercovitz, 
Copyright and Related Rights, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT 145 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). 
 170 WIPO administers the WCT, but the current baseline of G© is TRIPS, hence the 
focus thereupon. 
 171 TRIPS, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
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upon the old economy, or that underestimated the importance of 
the new economy, or that simply lacked the political power to 
object, were quick to join the WTO.172  In any case, opting out of 
TRIPS would have meant losing certain trade benefits, especially 
the ability to export agriculture and other goods to developed 
countries.  Now these countries realize that it is the new economy 
which is the key to development, and they realize that the price 
they paid is high and, in some cases, higher than they can afford.  
These countries did not realize that the limitations on the 
production and use of information that they accepted in exchange 
for the benefits in terms of export of goods would work against 
their interests.173 
The processes of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU),174 as well as the inclusion of the MFN principle in TRIPS 
provide further evidence of the focus on trade.175  The MFN 
principle originated in trade conventions, and until TRIPS, it was 
not part of the international IP regime.176 
Another aspect of TRIPS that emphasizes its trade-centered 
perspective is the discretion it grants member countries to 
determine the existence of exceptions to copyright protection.  
Members are required to expand copyright protection, but they 
are not also required to add exceptions.177  Since trade requires 
the transfer of property rights to the most efficient party – the 
party that can make the optimal use thereof178 -- and since trade 
requires certainty, exceptions to copyright protection act against 
the interest of trade.  Exceptions reduce the scope of protection, 
and, to the extent that they take the form of open standards, 
rather than provide clarity, they create uncertainty.  Narrower 
exceptions mean stronger copyright protection, which serves the 
trade ideology.179  Such a narrow regime of exceptions, however, 
 
 172 See discussion, supra Part II.C.1, especially text accompanying notes 53-64. 
 173 See the pre-TRIPS discussion in Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of 
Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
243 (1989). 
 174 See DSU, supra note 80, at art. 22(3). 
 175 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 4. 
 176 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 16-17 
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). 
 177 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 3(2). 
 178 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 2002). 
 179 Ruth Okediji writes: 
Unlike the “trade and environment” or “trade and human rights” linkages, 
however, where the explicit objective is to subject free trade to limits entailed by 
specific social welfare concerns, the trade and intellectual property linkage 
actually reinforces the free trade ideas as a normative absolute.  The TRIPS 
agreement, which is the embodiment of this linkage, contains very limited 
exceptions and there is no corresponding international norm that might serve 
as a counterpoise to its owner-centric, maximalist obligations. 
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leaves little room for other considerations, such as the public 
interest in the use of a creative work for teaching, or in the 
creation of new works based on existing ones.180  The rule is, 
therefore, that there is broad protection of intellectual property, 
and other considerations are at best, an exception. 
The shift to a trade ideology assumes the importance of 
copyright law and its protection of creative works, without asking 
fundamental questions about why such protection is warranted.  It 
focuses instead on second-order considerations.  Rather than 
justifying copyright in terms of a labor, instrumentalist, or 
personhood theory, copyright is framed exclusively in terms of 
trade. 
Under the ideology of trade, copyright law represents the 
ultimate commodification of creative works.  If the trade ideology 
requires all goods to be subject to a property regime, then the 
rights of property owners are valued above all others.  This means 
the inclusion of more rights in the copyright bundle of rights, as 
well as protection over a longer period of time and additional 
“para-copyright” legal protection such as the anti-circumvention 
rules prohibiting the bypassing of DRMs.181  The ideology of trade 
further instructs that all goods should be alienable.  Every good, 
including, for the purposes of this analysis, creative works, should 
be transferable, at the wish of its owners.  Reducing the level of 
copyright protection might limit an owner’s ability to capitalize on 
the work, and limitations on trade are akin to blasphemy.  The 
primacy of the public interest, which was at the core of United 
States copyright law, is reversed. 
The primacy of the ideology of trade underlying global 
copyright law has pushed aside alternative views of copyright.  
Once trade is the lens through which everything must be judged, 
culture loses its importance.  Under the trade ideology, culture 
might be relevant to the extent that it can be commodified or 
commercialized, but it is no longer a factor to be considered on its 
own.  The ideology of trade recognizes and promotes one factor 
only: the free global market.  The shift to a commodified culture 
 
Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 131, at 84-95 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 180 For the role of users in copyright law, see generally L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. 
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991); Julie E. Cohen, 
The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005). 
 181 See, e.g., WCT, supra note 90, at art. 11; DMCA, supra note 91 (which added chapter 
12 to the Copyright Act).  Although these rules are technically part of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, their subject matter is not the work of authorship, but rather the technological 
measures applied by the copyright owners to protect their works; hence it is only an 
indirect, ancillary protection.  The term “para-copyright” was first used in a letter written 
by copyright law professors to Congress, which was quoted in the congressional hearing.  
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998). 
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has a cost to our freedom, which is imposed on the global 
audience of users (or consumers, if one insists on trade-related 
language).  The cost is difficult to quantify, but, as the next Part 
will show, it includes the cost of losing freedom of speech.  This 
cost, like the gains of G©, is spread unevenly. 
III. TRADITIONS OF FREE SPEECH 
It is a well-known fact that different countries provide 
different levels of protection to speech.  A country’s free speech 
jurisprudence is the result of several factors, such as the country’s 
history, culture, and political and legal systems.  In addition to 
observing the diversity of speech regimes by exploring certain 
examples thereof, this article argues that the speech regime is 
local in nature, rather than global, and that the “free speech 
regime” has remained local, despite attempts to establish a global 
principle of freedom of expression.  Because of the culturally and 
politically contingent nature of free speech jurisprudence, such 
efforts at globalization are unlikely to succeed, although trade-
related speech may represent an exception to the localization of 
freedom of speech laws.182 
A. Global Speech? 
There have been many efforts to globalize freedom of 
expression through the use of international legal instruments.  
Chief among them is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.  
Article 19 thereof states, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”183 
Members of the United Nations are not bound by the 
Declaration, but it has nonetheless had a tremendous and 
 
 182 Trademark law, for example, is part of globalization.  Another exception is hate 
speech: as more countries find themselves under terrorist threats, they join hands in 
fighting terrorism.  Hate speech is sometimes affiliated with terrorism.  See, e.g., Council of 
Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention On Cybercrime, Concerning the 
Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through 
Computer Systems, Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. no. 189, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm. 
 183 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights].  For the history of the drafting of this article, see Juhani Kortteinen, 
Kristian Myntti & Lauri Hannikainen, Article 19, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS – A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 393, 401 (Gudmundur 
Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide eds., 1999) [hereinafter A COMMON STANDARD OF 
ACHIEVEMENT]. 
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worldwide impact.  In 1948, forty-eight of the fifty-eight United 
Nations member states adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and many additional countries have since announced their 
commitment thereto.184  The Universal Declaration has been 
expressly referred to in many constitutions, and it has inspired 
many more.185  It has had a far-reaching effect on the legal 
construction and interpretation of the concept of human rights.  
One commentator noted that it “exerts a moral, political, and 
legal influence far beyond the hopes of many of its drafters.”186  It 
is considered today to be “the primary source of global human 
rights standards,”187 and it is an important source of customary 
international law.188 
Although article 19 is stated as if the enumerated rights are 
absolute rights, no country applies them as absolute commands.  
Even the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
despite its strong language, was not interpreted as an absolute.189  
Furthermore, article 29 of the Universal Declaration allows 
limitations of the right, “[f]or the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society.”190  The 1996 Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, which is considered to be one of 
the most progressive constitutions in the world today, provides a 
clear illustration of this non-absolute nature of the right to free 
speech.191  The South African Constitution first announces the 
right to freedom of expression in a broad manner (“everyone has 
the right to freedom of expression”), then enumerates some 
concrete derivatives of this right, such as the freedom of the press 
or the freedom to receive information.  The Constitution then 
goes on to limit and exclude some forms of expression, such as 
propaganda for war, incitement of immediate violence, and 
 
 184 Due to its non-binding nature, the Declaration does not have a signatory system and 
hence there is no authoritative list of countries which adhere thereto. 
 185 See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human 
Rights: The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International 
Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1996) (surveying the influence of the 
Declaration worldwide). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 291. 
 188 Id. passim. 
 189 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  For an absolutist interpretation thereof, see Justice Black’s 
dissenting opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952).  See also Edmond 
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 
559 (1962). 
 190 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 183, at art. 29.  See Torkel 
Opsahl & Vojin Dimitrijevic, Article 29 and 30, in A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT, 
supra note 183, at 633. 
 191 S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
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advocacy of hatred.  However, the South African Constitution 
limits the right not only in this category-based manner, but in 
another way, that of balancing, which reflects article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration.  Section 36 of the South African Constitution 
states that 
The rights in the Bill of Rights [including the freedom of 
expression] may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors.192 
The section then lists five such factors with regard to the 
limitation of certain rights: the nature of the right, the importance 
of the limitation, the extent of the limitation, the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose, and the least restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose.193 
Other major international covenants convey a similar 
message, that free speech can be balanced against conflicting 
interests.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966 states: 
19.2 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice. 
19.3 The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of 
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  It 
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
1. For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
2. For the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.194 
Unlike the Universal Declaration, this definition of the right to 
free speech acknowledges that speech is not an absolute right.  
The International Covenant allows for the limitation of freedom of 
speech in two situations.  The first situation exists at the 
“horizontal” level, or the private sphere, where the conflict is 
between two private parties.  If one person’s speech might harm 
another’s reputation, privacy or other interests (such as 
copyright), then that speech may be restricted. 
 
 192 Id. § 36. 
 193 Id. 
 194 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), at 55, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
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The second situation in which free speech can be limited 
under the International Covenant is at the “vertical” level, where the 
conflict is between the state and a citizen due to a state-imposed 
limitation on the speech of an individual.  A restriction on speech 
in the interest of national security is the chief example of such a 
limitation, but the Covenant also lists other situations in which 
restrictions on free speech are permitted -- the protection of 
public order, public health, or public morals.  Limitations on 
speech are thus permitted only if two conditions are met: (1) that 
the restriction is by law, and (2) that it is necessary.  For those 
states that wish to limit free speech, these vague conditions can be 
easily satisfied.  The result is that the International Covenant 
provides a statement that is important for its political, educational, 
and moral power, but that is practically weak and can be easily 
bypassed. 
Other global or international initiatives are more specific.  
The Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, for example, 
declares that, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression” 
and enumerates the elements of this right (freedom to hold 
opinions, and to receive and impart information without 
governmental interference and across borders), but also subjects 
the right to limitations if some strict conditions are met.195 
The focus of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (1992) of the Council of Europe is even more specific.  
The Charter strives to guarantee the freedom of direct reception 
of broadcast across political borders, and to ensure that “no 
restrictions [are] placed on freedom of expression and free 
circulation of information in the written press in a language used 
in identical or similar form to a regional or minority language.”196 
A more recent legal instrument touching on speech rights is 
the Civil Society Declaration on Shaping Information Societies for 
Human Needs.197  This Declaration was adopted in December, 2003, 
by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which 
convened under the auspices of the International 
 
 195 See Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 
at arts. II-72, II-112, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/constitution/en/lstoc1_en.htm.  The Treaty is not yet in force, 
as at least two European Union Members (France and the Netherlands) have rejected its 
text.  For the current state of the treaty, see Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, http://europa.eu/constitution/referendum_en.htm (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2006). 
 196 See European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, June 5, 1992, 2044 
U.N.T.S. 577, at art. 11.2, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/148.htm. 
 197 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Shaping Information Societies 
for Human Needs: Civil Society Declaration to the World Summit on the Information 
Society, Dec. 8, 2003, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/civil-society-declaration.pdf. 
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Telecommunication Union (ITU), and focused on the digital 
environment.  The Civil Society Declaration is fascinating in that it 
is, in many respects, far removed from the agenda of the North, or 
more precisely, from the interests of many global mega-
corporations.198  In the context of copyright, for example, the 
Declaration states that “[e]xisting international copyright 
regulation instruments including TRIPS and WIPO should be 
reviewed to ensure that they promote cultural, linguistic and 
media diversity and contribute to the development of human 
knowledge.”199  The Declaration also explicitly refers to article 19 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and enumerates the 
rights to media, access, and speech that derive therefrom, 
especially in the context of the Internet.200  These commitments 
were reaffirmed in the second WSIS summit in Tunis, in 
November, 2005.201 
B. Balancing Speech with Local Interests 
The international attempts at the pronouncement of a global 
free speech principle are composed of two elements: a (global) 
rule and (local) exceptions.  This “rule and exception” structure 
provides for the balancing of conflicting rights and interests.  
While balancing was rejected by United States constitutional law as 
an invalid methodology,202 it is very much alive elsewhere.203 
Balancing free speech with conflicting rights and interests 
requires recognizing that the right to free speech is not absolute.  
Importantly, the fact that speech is balanced against other rights 
and interests does not, in itself, dictate the outcome of the 
balancing test.  The result of the constitutional methodology of 
balancing depends on the weight accorded to each of the 
conflicting interests or rights and the way the balance is structured 
to begin with and then upon the way it is applied. 
How should the balancing formula be constructed?  Which 
 
 198 The divergence of the WSIS from the politics of the North and the agenda of the 
mega-corporations is apparent throughout the Declaration, for example, in its call to 
promote free software.  Id. § 2.3.3.3 ¶ 2. 
 199 Id. § 2.3.1.3. 
 200 Id. §§ 2.1.5, 2.2.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3. 
 201 See WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS Doc. No. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/7-E (Nov. 18, 
2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html. 
 202 For a discussion of balancing in the United States, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1986).  Perhaps “balancing” 
acquired a negative reputation in the United States due to “ad hoc balancing.”  A less 
objectionable type of balancing is what Melville Nimmer called “definitional balancing.”  
Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970). 
 203 For a comprehensive statement on balancing, see Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: 
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 93–97 (2002) (outlining 
the constitutional methodology of balancing). 
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interests are worthy of being balanced against the right to free 
speech?  There are various examples around the globe, including 
the South African constitution, discussed above.  Likewise, the 
Canadian Charter instructs that the rights and freedoms set therein 
can be subject “only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”204  
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states in 
article 10(2) that freedom of expression can be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.205 
The ECHR thus lists both the interests that may supersede 
freedom of expression and the general formula for balancing 
them against one another.  European Courts added that the 
restriction on speech should be proportional to the legitimate aim 
pursued.206 
Other jurisdictions have adopted their own balancing 
formulas, and it is these formulas that create a space for local 
considerations.  A country must decide for itself how to serve its 
national security interests, how to ensure the public order, and 
how to define its morals.  And a country must determine the 
weight it accords to these conflicting interests.  These decisions 
are political in nature and may be fiercely disputed within a 
country.  Chief Justice Shimon Agrant stated in one of Israel’s 
most important constitutional free speech opinions that “[i]t is a 
well known axiom that the law of a people must be studied in the 
light of its national way of life.”207  A critical example of the need 
for balancing is demonstrated in the case of changing national 
security interests: indeed, when new threats materialize and 
threaten the security of a country, the law must respond to such 
 
 204 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), available at 
http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html.  See also R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 
(Can.) (containing a discussion on the subject). 
 205 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. 
 206 See, e.g., Jason Coppel & Michael Supperstone, Judicial Review after the Human Rights 
Act, 3 E.H.R.L. REV. 301, 312 (1999). 
 207 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am Co. v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871, 884, 
translated in 1 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 90, 105 (E. David 
Goitein ed., 1953). 
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changing needs.208 
If free speech jurisprudence revolves around national 
interests and local political decisions, the reason for its focus on 
the governmental paradigm becomes clear.  Because 
governmental interests are accorded more weight than private 
interests, a country’s free speech jurisprudence will be shaped first 
and foremost by the threats to free speech that come from 
governmental, rather than market forces.  The horizontal level of 
the private sphere remains secondary, but this does not mean that 
the horizontal level lacks value judgments.  On the contrary, 
formulating a definitional balance between free speech and other 
human rights, such as the right to privacy, reputation, or property, 
does indeed reflect the values of the community.  What comprises 
a person’s reputation?  What is the scope of privacy?  Is property 
more important than free speech?  These are deeply political 
decisions, contingent upon elusive factors such as society, culture, 
and a people’s “national way of life.”209 
The annual report on freedom of the press by Freedom 
House confirms these intuitions about the status of free speech 
around the world.210  While a free press is only one aspect of free 
speech, the Freedom House reports provide the most 
comprehensive survey on the status of speech.  Given the focus on 
the press, the reports examine restrictions on speech at primarily 
the vertical level.  The reports rate the degree of freedom based 
on the legal environment in which the media operates and the 
amount of political influence over reporting and access to 
information.  The reports also examine restrictions at the 
horizontal level by taking into account economic pressures on 
content.211  The most recent report concluded that in 2004, “out of 
194 countries and territories surveyed, 75 countries (39%) were 
rated Free, 50%) were rated Partly Free, and 69 (35%) were rated 
 
 208 This is true of the United States as well.  See, e.g., the post-World War I speech cases, 
such as Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and the congressional response to 
9/11, in the form of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 
105, 201-02, 204, 212, 214, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 209 Kol Ha’am, 7(2) P.D. at 884.  See Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the 
Bounds of Comparative Analysis, 58 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 67, 77 (2001) (providing an 
interesting example of the different social and value choices of the United States and 
Canada: whereas the latter is “committed to multiculturalism and group-regarding 
quality,” the United States emphasizes “individualism and an assimilationist ideal”; and 
arguing that these social and normative differences explain the difference in 
constitutional jurisprudence on hate speech). 
 210 Freedom House is a non-governmental organization.  Freedom House, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
 211 See Karin Deutsch Karlekar, Press Freedom in 2004, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=131&year=2005 (last visited Aug. 22, 
2006). 
  
2006] GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, LOCAL SPEECH 537 
Not Free.”212  This report will be referred to further in the 
following Part. 
Free speech jurisprudence thus remains local in nature and 
reflects the different ideologies, politics, and cultural choices of 
each jurisdiction.  The processes of globalization, however 
powerful, are unlikely to render these differences obsolete. 
C. Free Speech and Free Trade 
What then, is the relationship between free speech and free 
trade?  If a country adopts a free trade policy, will it become 
(more) democratic?  A comparison of WTO members at varying 
stages of development with the list generated by the Freedom 
House report confirms the intuition that there is a strong 
correlation between free speech and free trade.  First, the list of 
WTO members (as of July, 2006) was divided into three categories, 
applying the “globalization” terminology of developed-developing-
least developed countries.  Second, this list was compared with the 
list generated by Freedom House.213  The results are as follows: 
Of the fifty LDCs, thirty-two are WTO members.  Only three 
are classified by Freedom House as “Free,”214 eleven are classified 
as “Partly Free,”215 and eighteen are classified as “Not Free.”216 
 
 212 Id. 
 213 A few short methodological notes are in order.  As mentioned supra note 34, the 
United Nations publishes a list of LDCs, but not of developed or developing countries.  
The WTO relies on the U.N.’s LDC list, but enables each remaining country to choose for 
itself its status as a developed or developing country.  See Who Are the Developing 
Countries in the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
  The comparison that follows in the text focused on the 149 countries currently 
members of the WTO.  The category of developed countries was composed according to 
the World Bank’s list of twenty-four High Income Countries, which is derivative of the list 
of thirty members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).  The World Bank’s list is available at The World Bank, Data and Statistics 
(2006), http://tinyurl.com/ane6m, and the OECD’s list is available at OECD, Member 
Countries, http://tinyurl.com/2jksv (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
  The shorter list of the World Bank’s High Income list includes: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South 
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.  The six countries which 
are OECD members but not on the World Bank list are the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland, The Slovak Republic and Turkey.  All thirty OECD countries are WTO 
members.  The remainder of the two lists (of developed countries and LDCs) were 
classified as developing countries.  Some of these developing countries are defined by the 
World Bank as “high income economies,” but are either not members of the OECD or are 
not on the twenty-four “high income” list.  Examples are Israel, Singapore and the United 
Arab Emirates.  For the full list, see The World Bank, Data & Statistics (2006), 
http://tinyurl.com/9p6kf.   
  The other classification of countries listed according to their level of freedom of 
speech was composed according to the 2004 report of Freedom House (published in late 
2005), taking freedom of the press to be a proxy for freedom of speech in general. 
 214 Benin, Mali and Solomon Islands. 
 215 Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda. 
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Of the developing countries,217 the division is as follows: thirty-
one countries are “Free,”218 twenty-eight countries are “Partly 
Free,”219 and twenty-seven are “Not Free.”220 
Of the twenty-four developed countries, all but two (Norway 
and Italy, which were classified as Partly Free) are classified by 
Freedom House as “Free countries.”  Of the additional six OECD 
members that are not considered High Income countries, four 
were classified as “Free,” and two (Mexico and Turkey) as “Partly 
Free.”  None of the developed countries was classified as “Not 
Free.” 
The correlation between free trade and free speech does not 
necessarily mean that there is a causal link between the two.  
However, for the purpose of the argument that follows, causation 
does not matter.  If, on the one hand, as many in the North 
believe, free trade promotes, in the long term, a more democratic 
form of government, which includes free speech,221 then one 
should not ignore any impediment to the goal of achieving free-
speech.  To the extent that copyright law is such an impediment, 
the conflict between free speech and copyright law should be 
addressed.  If, on the other hand, there is no causal link between 
free trade and freedom in general, then imposing a trade-oriented 
copyright law onto countries that lack free speech will only serve 
to reduce freedom of speech without bringing the long-term 
benefits of democracy.  In other words, free trade might mean 
freedom of some to conduct business, but it does not necessarily 
mean freedom of speech.222 
 
 216 Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Maldives, Mauritania, 
Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Rwanda, Togo, Zambia. 
 217 Macao is listed as an independent member of the WTO, but is not independently 
classified by Freedom House.  Rather, it is listed as Macao (China). For this reason, it is 
left out of the analysis here. 
 218 Estonia, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, 
Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Hong Kong, Israel, Jamaica, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovenia, South Africa, Suriname, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay. 
 219 Albania, Antigua, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Croatia, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand. 
 220 Armenia, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cameron, China, Columbia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Moldova, Morocco, North 
Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Swaziland, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
 221 The classic arguments remain those of FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO 
SERFDOM (1944) and MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
 222 Fredrich Jameson writes that: 
It is in particular important ironically to distance the rhetoric of freedom – not 
merely free trade, but free speech, the free passage of ideas and intellectual 
“properties” – which accompany this [U.S. GATT cultural] policy . . . .  The 
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Equipped with the understanding that speech and its legal 
protection are local in nature, combined with previous 
conclusions about the nature of G©, the copyright law/free 
speech conflict comes into focus.  The comparison of free trade 
and free speech will demonstrate that G© serves the free trade 
interests of the North, and disserves the free speech interests of 
the South. 
IV. COPYRIGHT AND SPEECH 
Is there a conflict between copyright law and free speech?  
The conflict is readily apparent to some, but to others, especially 
courts, the conflict does not exist.223  The existence of a conflict 
between copyright law and free speech does not run through every 
element of copyright law, nor does it mean that copyright law is 
inherently unconstitutional.  Acknowledging the conflict, 
however, does require an awareness of the ways in which the 
exceptions to copyright protection resolve the free speech 
considerations, and it also requires an interpretation of copyright 
law that does not run afoul of free speech principles. 
This Part will first survey the conflict argument and the 
various judicial responses thereto.  It will also point to the 
weaknesses of these responses.  The discussion focuses on single 
jurisdictions before returning to the global arena.  The second 
section will “go global” by examining the conflict between G© and 
the local traditions of free speech. 
A. Is There a Conflict? 
The response to the conflict argument, first raised thirty-six 
years ago in the United States, has developed and changed over 
the years.  The initial response was simply that there is no 
conflict,224 suggesting that speech and copyright are completely 
separate and unrelated legal concepts.  Later, the refusal to 
recognize a conflict between free speech and copyright was based 
on historical and constitutional reasoning: the framers saw no 
conflict, as the IP clause and the First Amendment live side by 
side.225 
 
freedom of those corporations (and their dominant nation-state) is scarcely the 
same thing as our individual freedom as citizens. 
Fredrich Jameson, Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue, in THE CULTURE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 54, 60 (Fredrich Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 1998). 
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These reasons, however, failed to convince scholars and 
lawyers, who continued to argue that there is a conflict between 
free speech and copyright law, and consequently, another more 
substantial response emerged from the American judiciary.  
Courts reasoned that both copyright law and free speech 
principles share the same goal, that of promoting speech.  Each 
legal field simply applies different means toward the same end.  
Copyright law aims at the market by providing incentives to 
authors to make works and acts as a substitute for governmental 
intervention in the creative process.  Conversely, the First 
Amendment aims at the government and prevents it from limiting 
speech.  Hence, there is no conflict, but rather, a beneficial 
cooperation between the two areas of law.  This has been called 
the shared goal argument,226 and is best encapsulated in Justice 
O’Connor’s 1985 judicial sound bite: “In our haste to disseminate 
news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”227  Since then, 
both legal fields have expanded to such an extent that, even if 
there were no conflict between free speech and copyright at the 
time, there is one now.228 
The shared goal argument tells a story in which there is a 
division of labor between copyright and freedom of speech.  The 
shared goal argument thus assumes that copyright and freedom of 
speech occupy entirely separate realms of influence.  The shared 
goal argument further refuses to accept the fact that copyright law 
itself is a governmental act and should be subject to judicial 
scrutiny. 
The principal response to the shared goal argument was that 
Congress had already taken into consideration free speech 
concerns in copyright law, and had built into the copyright laws 
certain mechanisms to resolve any potential problems.229  The 
main “free speech ambassadors” within copyright law are the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.230  According 
to this response to the shared goal argument, the idea/expression 
dichotomy excludes ideas from copyright law, and hence enables 
the marketplace of ideas to operate without interference, and the 
fair use defense allows a breathing space for speech, in that it 
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exempts criticism and other expressive activities. 
The study of the conflict argument and the judicial response 
thereto reveals that there are, in fact, two conflicts at stake, and 
they are often confused.231  One conflict exists at the constitutional 
level, where one clause of the Constitution (the “promote the 
progress” clause)232 empowers Congress to enact copyright laws, 
and another (the First Amendment) prohibits the limitation of 
speech.  This conflict is called the external conflict.233  The other 
conflict is the internal conflict, which exists within copyright law 
and represents the fundamental tension upon which copyright law 
is built.  Copyright law must address the conflicting interests of the 
author and of the public; it must serve the goal of encouraging 
creativity and the dissemination of creative works, but it must do 
so by placing control over those creative works in the hands of 
property owners, who may then prevent those works from being 
used as building blocks for new creativity.  It is also a conflict 
between the long term goal of promoting creativity by providing 
incentives to make works of authorship and the short term means 
to achieve such incentives by limiting the access to, and the use of 
those works.234  The observation that there are in fact two conflicts, 
as opposed to just one, leads to a further observation.  While users 
of copyrighted works advancing a conflict argument often pointed 
to the external conflict, the judicial response, which was to deny 
the conflict, did so by referring to the internal conflict, stating that 
the conflict had been solved at the internal level.  This kind of 
response, addressing the external conflict in terms of the internal 
conflict, may be called the internalization of the conflict 
argument. 
There are two ways in which the response to the conflict 
argument is internalized.235  The first is substantive internalization, 
whereby the conflict argument is rejected on a philosophical (and 
historical) level.  This type of internalization must, therefore, 
assume a specific justification of copyright law, as only under the 
instrumental view, where copyright is understood to have a goal, 
can one say that the goal of copyright law is shared by free speech 
jurisprudence.  This response also assumes a particular kind of 
free speech philosophy, one that has a goal (and is not an end in 
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itself), and this goal needs to be one that fits the goal of copyright 
law.236 
The other form of internalization of the conflict argument is 
the mechanical internalization, where some copyright law 
mechanisms are designated to play a role in mitigating the 
conflict.237  This form of internalization, in turn, assumes a division 
of labor between Congress and the judiciary, a division that, in 
light of judicial review, might be fallacious.  The mechanical 
internalization should furthermore force courts to interpret 
copyright law in such a way that enables the internal copyright 
mechanisms to truly fulfill their constitutional tasks.  This is 
especially so with regard to the fair use defense: it should be 
interpreted broadly and vigorously as to reflect its task of 
representing the First Amendment within copyright law. 
In Eldred, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
(CTEA).238  The Court rejected the arguments against the Act, 
including a First Amendment challenge.  Justice Ginsburg first 
discussed the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, 
both referred to as “built-in First Amendment accommodations,”239 
and then concluded that “[t]o the extent such assertions raise 
First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards are generally adequate to address them.”240  The Court 
thus injected fresh constitutional rationale into the fair use 
doctrine, which previously had been justified solely on bases 
internal to copyright law.241  This means that even if the conflict 
between them is denied, free speech principles do have an effect 
on the way copyright law is constructed and interpreted in the 
United States.  Thus, copyright law and free speech have reached 
an uneasy sort of co-existence in the United States.  The 
equilibrium might change over the course of the years, as 
copyright law and First Amendment jurisprudence evolve, but 
nevertheless, the tension is present. 
This discussion of the internal and external conflicts and 
substantive versus mechanical internalization aids in the 
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understanding of the different responses to the conflict argument 
in the United States judiciary and that of other jurisdictions, 
especially the European Union and the United Kingdom.242  The 
constitutional backdrop of the latter jurisdictions explicitly 
permits the balancing of free speech considerations with other 
rights and interests, and thus, the harm caused to freedom of 
expression by copyright law is understood there differently than it 
is in the United States.  The prevalent understanding of copyright, 
which focuses on the individual author as opposed to the public, 
renders the shared goal argument irrelevant on the Continent.  
The result is that the conflict argument remains on the external, 
constitutional level, and the response is in the form of mechanical, 
not substantive internalization.243 
In short, the theory behind copyright law matters.  It matters 
not only in terms of the interpretation and application of 
copyright law, but also for other reasons, namely the protection of 
free speech.  Copyright law grants owners control over their works.  
The creative process requires building on previous works, which 
requires access to such works and the ability to borrow ideas and 
facts (which, of course, are not protected by copyright law), as well 
as the freedom to use the expressive parts of the existing works to 
create new works.  The freedom to use and reuse works is 
necessary to the creative process, but it also has a constitutional 
relevance, in that it enables the exercise of free speech.  When 
speakers are limited in the way they can express themselves – even 
if the limitation stems from market, not governmental forces, and 
even if the limitation is justified – their speech rights are limited.  
Such limitation requires an explanation.  Accordingly, the various 
judicial responses to the conflict argument might be accepted if 
they also serve to inform the interpretation and application of 
exceptions and defenses to copyright.  However, in order for the 
effects on speech to be taken seriously within copyright law, the 
conflict must first be acknowledged. 
B. Global Conflict 
This article has shown that copyright law has become global 
and that the only ideology behind G© is that of trade.  How does 
the conflict argument play out under such circumstances?  Is there 
an external conflict between copyright law and free speech, an 
internal conflict within copyright law, or perhaps both?  Can a 
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meaningful internalization of the conflict take place in countries 
which lack a strong tradition of free speech or which have been 
affected by G©? 
The external conflict, as defined earlier, is one between two 
separate fields of law: copyright law on the one hand, and free 
speech jurisprudence on the other.  Once an external conflict is 
identified, one may resolve the conflict through substantive 
internalization or mechanical internalization; but each method of 
resolution has consequences.  Copyright law and free speech have 
reached a balance on the local level in some jurisdictions.  To the 
extent that there is a clash between the two legal fields in the 
United States, for example, the response that copyright enables 
freedom of expression is partially convincing.  Now copyright law 
is exported from the North to the South, without the parallel 
export of free speech jurisprudence.  Since it takes two for a 
conflict, one cannot frame the problem as a conflict, let alone 
devise means to solve it.  The balance of the North is inapplicable 
in the South. 
Some of the developing and less developed countries do have 
some local free speech law, and they might have already reached 
equilibrium in the copyright/speech conflict.  However, now one 
side of the balance (copyright law) has changed, and the other 
(local free speech law) has remained unchanged.  While countries 
with a solid free speech principle may be able to reach a balance 
with copyright law, most of those countries already have a strong 
copyright law, which is compatible with G© and its free trade 
ideology.  For those countries that lack any meaningful tradition 
of free speech, however, the lack of a viable counter-measure to 
copyright law is the least of their democratic deficiencies.  Local 
law is thus not likely to have an impact on the copyright-speech 
conflict at the global level. 
For the fifty-five countries classified as “developing countries” 
and rated either as “Not Free” or as “Partially Free” by Freedom 
House, the price of G© matters the most.  These countries do not 
have the local strength to ease the pressure of copyright law, and 
the imposition of G© void of philosophical justification might well 
result in a clash between the global and the local.  This is the clash 
between copyright law and freedom of speech, between a 
consequentialist trade ideology and deontological human rights 
theory.244 
It is in these “Not Free” or “Partially Free” developing 
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countries that GloCalization is likely to emerge.  Courts faced with 
a free speech/copyright conflict can either imitate the United 
States response, which would mean ignoring the local nature of 
free speech jurisprudence, or they can turn to local free speech 
law for a solution, to the extent that it is available.  The local laws 
may not manage to overcome the conflict, but they can serve to 
mitigate the effects of G©.  This reliance on the local free speech 
jurisprudence may result in a more reasonable application of 
copyright law, and a less proprietary, more civilized regime.  It can 
protect genuine national interests, like education, access to 
knowledge, and the preservation of language, culture and other 
social norms.  Reliance on the local jurisprudence can thus serve 
to soften the aggressive nature of the global. 
In order for this to happen, however, a developing country 
must acknowledge the anti-speech potential of copyright law, 
understand that it requires a response, and be able to withstand 
the political pressure flowing from the North, which demands 
adherence to G©.  Copyright law might inspire a country’s 
creativity and foster the growth of knowledge and science, and 
globalization might ultimately promote local industries and 
encourage foreign investors.  But until the positive benefits can be 
felt, a country must make the transition from local to global, and 
its citizens must have access to information, to knowledge and to 
global culture. 
Furthermore, the goal of copyright law must be recognized 
even in those countries which do have viable local free speech 
jurisprudence, in order for the shared goal argument to make any 
sense.  It might be that the “Framers [of the U.S. Constitution] 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression,”245 
but the framers of G© had no such intentions.  G© is void of any 
ideology other than that of trade; G© has no embedded values 
that converge or overlap with those of free speech; and absent any 
common ground, the shared goal argument and the substantive 
internalization both collapse. 
For many jurisdictions, therefore, it does not make sense to 
speak of an external conflict, and, even if there is such a conflict, it 
cannot be internalized on any philosophical level.  Accordingly, 
one turns to the internal level.  Perhaps G© can carry with it some 
internal mechanisms to ease the tension.  Can internal 
mechanisms “take care” of free speech concerns when copyright 
law is dictated to and imposed upon countries without 
consideration for their history and culture? 
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The primary internal mechanisms within copyright law that 
can act as ambassadors of free speech are the idea/expression 
dichotomy and exceptions to copyright protection, such as the 
United States’ fair use doctrine.  However, these mechanisms are 
absent from the global instruments, or worse, they are relegated to 
a secondary position.246  The bilateral agreements likewise do not 
carve out exceptions, and it remains to be seen whether the 
unilateral measures will include them or not (however, the 
USTR’s annual 301 Report has yet to require a country to create 
broader exceptions to copyright).247  Countries new to copyright 
law, or those that adjust their copyright law to fit G©, are not 
equipped with sufficient internal mechanisms to accommodate 
free speech concerns.  Hence, when G© is imposed on these 
countries, it is not a balanced copyright law.  The price of G© will 
be paid, inter alia, in the currency of free speech. 
Global copyright does not, and can not, take care of the 
conflict between copyright and free speech in any meaningful 
manner. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article began by observing globalization and the 
social/political phenomenon of GloCalization, the social space in 
which the global meets the local.  GloCalization can either be 
viewed as a battlefield in which cultures are pitted against political 
power, or it can be a space of productive interaction.  Turning to 
intellectual property and copyright law, and placing it within the 
general framework of globalization, global copyright was found to 
be detached from its philosophical justifications and understood, 
unfortunately, solely in the context of one ideology: free trade.  
While copyright has become global, free speech jurisprudence has 
remained local in nature.  The “law of expressions” around the 
world varies and depends on the history of the nation, its general 
culture and its legal culture. 
Examining the alleged conflict between copyright and free 
speech, this article revealed that there are actually two conflicts at 
stake: one at the constitutional level, external to copyright law; 
and the other within copyright law itself.  The common responses 
to the conflict (substantive internalization, or the “shared goal 
argument,” and mechanical internalization, or the reliance on 
free-speech safeguards built in to copyright law) suggest a new 
level of understanding the copyright-free speech conflict as a 
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GloCalization problem: global copyright law conflicts with local 
free speech traditions. 
There are several (political) lessons to be taken from this 
endeavor.  One is addressed to the North: exporting G© and 
imposing it onto unwilling recipient countries has a price in terms 
of free speech.  Indeed, as shown, many of the countries whose 
copyright law is based on the G© regime lack satisfactory freedom 
of speech.  Almost ironically, however, a balanced form of 
copyright law can assist in spreading not only trade but freedom as 
well.  Acknowledging the free speech implications of copyright law 
is a first step in resolving the problem.  Being tolerant to processes 
of GloCalization is a second important step.  When the North 
suggests that the new copyright regimes will serve the countries 
upon which it is imposed, it is important to remember the conflict 
and to insist that copyright be accompanied with viable free 
speech laws.  Imagine the North bundling copyright with speech 
and tying the level of copyright protection accorded to a country 
to the strength of its free speech jurisprudence.  In this way, G© 
would truly achieve the promises of globalization.  It is important 
to understand that the global cannot replace the local overnight; a 
dialectic process of reconciliation between the two spheres should 
be expected. 
As for the lesson to be learned by global institutions, this 
article has shown that focusing on trade alone may have grave 
unintended consequences.  A truly free (global) trade will benefit 
not only from unified trade laws, but from stronger democracies 
and better protection of human rights.  If access to knowledge is 
assured in a free environment, in which one can reuse creative 
works to create new knowledge, then copyright law can indeed 
serve as an engine of global progress, of science and of free 
speech. 
 
